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This dissertation contains three essays. Each considers an economic decision faced by 
elderly households.  
The cost of nursing home care represents a substantial financial risk for older households. 
Yet, only 10 percent purchase long-term care insurance (LTCI), with many relying on 
Medicaid. The first essay estimates a structural model of the LTCI purchase decision 
using Health and Retirement Study data. Estimates indicate that this population has a 
modest preference for higher quality care and thus Medicaid crowds out LTCI. In 
addition, housing wealth provides self-insurance against the cost of nursing home care, so 
that individuals who are “house-rich cash-poor” are less likely to purchase LTCI. I also 
evaluate public policies designed to stimulate the take-up of LTCI and reduce Medicaid 
spending. I find that a comprehensive 20 percent subsidy would increase take-up by 160 
percent, but the resulting Medicaid savings would amount to only 22 percent of the 
subsidy cost. A targeted subsidy would be more likely to break even, but would have 
only a small effect on coverage. Full enforcement of Medicaid estate recovery programs 
would reduce Medicaid expenditure by 31 percent, but would have insignificant effect on 
LTCI coverage. 
The second essay investigates the impact of house prices fluctuations on the non-durable 
goods consumption decision of older households. House prices in the United States 
fluctuate over time with significant regional variation. Thus, understanding how these 
price movements affect households’ consumption has important policy implications. 
Existing studies focus mostly on the working population, leaving the effect of older 
households, who could be either the largest beneficiaries or victims of house price 
fluctuations, unexamined. Using Health and Retirement Study data, I show that house 
price fluctuations significantly affect non-durable goods consumption of older 
households. Estimates indicate that both the wealth effect and a relaxed borrowing 
constraint increase consumption when house prices appreciate. In addition, I find that 
only unexpected changes in house prices lead to changes in consumption of non-credit 
constrained households, which is consistent with economic theory predictions. Finally, I 
provide evidence that older households usually fund the additional consumption by 
increasing mortgage debt, rather than by drawing down financial assets. 
The third essay evaluates the value of the additional longevity insurance acquired by 
delaying claiming social security benefit. Individuals can claim Social Security at any age 
from 62 to 70, although most claim at 62 or soon thereafter. Those who delay claiming 
receive increases that are approximately actuarially fair. I show that expected present 
value calculations substantially understate both the optimal claim age and the losses 
resulting from early claiming because they ignore the value of the additional longevity 
insurance acquired as a result of delay. Using numerical optimization techniques, I 
illustrate that for plausible preference parameters, the optimal age for non-liquidity 
constrained single individuals and married men to claim benefit is between 67 and 70. I 
calculate that Social Security Equivalent Income, the amount by which benefits payable 
at suboptimal ages must be increased so that a household is indifferent between claiming 
at those ages and the optimal combination of ages, can be as high as 19 percent. 
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Chapter 1 
A Dynamic Analysis of Long-Term Care Insurance Decisions  
 
1.1 Introduction 
The cost of nursing home care represents a significant financial risk for the elderly. In 
2008, the average national rate for a private room in a nursing home was $212 per day, or 
$77,380 annually (MetLife, 2008). This amount far exceeds the mean annual Social 
Security income of $10,849 in 2006.1 But Figure 1, based on the Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS) data for the period 1996-2006, shows that only about 10 percent of older 
individuals held long-term care insurance (LTCI) contracts. Thus, the missing market for 
LTCI is unexpected and contradicts standard economic theory, which states that risk-
averse individuals should hedge large financial uncertainties.  
In aggregate, total nursing home expenditures were $131.3 billion in 2007 and are 
expected to grow rapidly in the next few decades as baby boomers age. Yet, only about 
7.5 percent of the total expenditure was paid by LTCI (Hartman, et al., 2009) because of 
the slim market. Almost half of the expenditure was paid by Medicaid, the publicly 
financed health program for the poor. Current public policies intend to reduce the 
increasing financial pressure on Medicaid spending by encouraging individuals to 
purchase LTCI. Thus, understanding the reasons why people do not make use of LTCI is 
crucial if policymakers are to design appropriate policies.  
                                                            
1 Author’s calculation, using RAND Social Security retirement benefit. 
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Using Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data, this chapter builds a structural model to 
investigate why older individuals do not purchase LTCI. The novelty is that it introduces 
a new preference parameter that captures the utility loss if older individuals seek care at 
low-quality nursing facilities. The parameter is termed “nursing home care quality 
preference parameter” in this chapter. Because this parameter represents disutility, it is 
expected to always be negative. A large absolute value of the care quality preference 
parameter indicates that individuals gain greater utility from being treated at high-quality 
nursing home. This gain may be sufficient to compensate for the utility loss from the 
reduction in consumption resulting from the expenditure on LTCI premiums. A small 
absolute value of the care quality preference parameter shows a weaker willingness to 
pay for insurance premiums in order to guarantee high-quality nursing home care when 
necessary. Using HRS data, this chapter estimates a modest care quality preference 
parameter. Therefore, given the fact that older individuals can always rely on Medicaid to 
cover the cost of low-quality nursing home care after they exhaust their financial wealth, 
there is a weak demand for LTCI. In addition, this chapter finds that older households 
rich in housing wealth tend to use their housing assets to self-insure against nursing home 
expenditure. In an experiment in which individuals are prevented from using housing 
wealth to pay for nursing home care, the simulated LTCI coverage rate increases by 85.3 
percent. Finally, policy experiments illustrate that the private market could be boosted 
significantly by comprehensive premium subsidies, but not by targeted premium 
subsidies and increasing the effectiveness of estate recovery programs (ERPs). 
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Simulations also suggest that the reduction in Medicaid expenditure resulting from 
premium subsidies would be insufficient to offset the subsidy cost.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces relevant background 
and literature. Section 3 uses a two-period naïve model to intuitively explore the 
implications of the proposed nursing home care quality preference parameter, as well as 
the impact of financial and housing wealth on LTCI decisions. Section 4 uses HRS data 
to estimate a structural model and examines possible reasons why people do not make use 
of LTCI. Section 5 details counterfactual experiments that evaluate potential public 
policies. The final section concludes. 
 
1.2 Background and Literature 
1.2.1 Long-Term Care  
Unlike acute care, long-term care (LTC) provides a variety of services that help people 
who have trouble with the basic activities of daily living (ADLs), such as dressing, eating, 
bathing, transferring, toileting and continence, or instrumental activities of daily living 
(IADLs), such as grocery shopping, preparing meals, taking medication, and managing 
money. LTC can be categorized as either home care or nursing home care. Home care is 
usually provided by home health aides. In 2007, the national average hourly rate for a 
home health aide was $19 (MetLife, 2007). Since individuals are treated at their homes, 
the quality of care can be easily adjusted. Individuals can always hire different caregivers 
and request different services at will. Nursing home care treats more severe cases in 
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special nursing facilities where patients are provided medical and ADL services. In 2008, 
the national average cost of a private room in a nursing home was $77,380 annually, 
which is a heavy financial burden for older households. To switch the quality of nursing 
home care is also challenging. For one, it can be difficult for patients to transition from 
one facility to another. A more crucial issue is that it is often difficult to obtain a bed at a 
good nursing home, especially if the patient does not have adequate financial resources or 
insurance coverage. Thus, this chapter focuses on nursing home care and insurance that 
covers the costs associated with it.  
 
1.2.2 Financing Nursing Home Care 
There are five ways older individuals pay for nursing homes: Medicaid (41.7 percent), 
out-of-pocket (30.4 percent), Medicare (17.7 percent), LTCI (7.5 percent), and other (2.7 
percent).2 Medicaid, the publicly financed health program for the poor, serves as the 
payer of last resort. Individuals are covered by Medicaid only after they have exhausted 
their financial assets and income. While eligibility requirements vary by state, most states 
start Medicaid eligibility once the financial assets of single households fall below 
$2,000.3 In addition, any income exceeding $30 per month must be used to cover the cost 
of care. One point worth mentioning here is that Medicaid treats housing wealth 
differently from financial assets. Before 1993, housing was generally exempted from the 
                                                            
2 Hartman et al. (2009); numbers are for 2007. 
3 To prevent impoverishment of spouses, married couples are subject to a different, more complicated 
Medicaid asset test. See Brown, Coe, and Finkelstein (2007) for details. 
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Medicaid asset test. In other words, as long as their financial assets fell below $2,000, 
individuals could receive Medicaid benefits and still retain their houses. This made the 
house an attractive asset for people with bequest motives. The Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93) required that all states adopt estate recovery 
programs (ERPs). These programs allow states to seek reimbursement of Medicaid 
expenditures from housing wealth after the death of the claimant and make housing 
wealth no longer a safe asset for bequest. Although most states have adopted ERPs now, 
the amounts recovered from housing wealth are extremely small. In 2005, the national 
recovery rate was a mere 0.61 percent of total Medicaid nursing home expenditures 
(Wood and Klem, 2007). In addition, this chapter estimates a reduced form model and 
finds that ERPs do not have a significant effect on LTCI coverage for single households. 
This might reflect both program design and enforcement, with people correctly believing 
there is a low risk of recovery action being successful. Therefore, although Medicaid 
asset and income test rules are fully incorporated, ERPs are omitted from the structural 
model. It instead proposes an experiment to investigate how LTCI coverage would 
change given fully functioning ERPs in all states.  
Older individuals can also pay for LTC out of pocket. However, since the type, time, and 
cost of care that might be needed is unknown, this approach could result in a large utility 
loss. If individuals save to pay for high-quality care, they must substantially reduce 
current consumption. But if they do not save, they may suffer the disutility of low-quality 
care.  
5 
 
Another publicly funded health program, Medicare, pays for short-term nursing home 
stays. The coverage is restricted to post-acute care where patients need to be categorized 
as “treatable” to be eligible. People who require long-term nursing home stays and have 
little chance to return to their homes are not eligible for Medicare. As this chapter focuses 
on long-period stays in nursing homes, Medicare is not included. 
The remaining option is LTCI. In 2006, 96 percent of LTCI contracts covered the cost of 
nursing home care.4 The premium is determined by the age of the insured, maximum 
daily benefit, the length of benefit period, the length of elimination period, and whether 
the contract includes inflation protection. The premium increases substantially with age 
of purchase. For example, a 65-year-old individual would pay $389.605 per month for a 
comprehensive plan that provides an inflation-indexed $200 maximum daily benefit for 
unlimited periods. The same plan would cost $806.80 per month if purchasing at age 75 
and $1,569.60 per month if purchasing at age 85. In addition, the premium is not based 
on gender, although women are at greater risk of requiring nursing home care and have 
higher durations of stay.  
 
1.2.3 Quality of Care 
Researchers have shown that there are substantial differences in quality among nursing 
homes. Because of the low Medicaid reimbursement rate, the profit margin is usually 
                                                            
4 Author’s calculation, based on 2006 wave of the HRS. 
5 The premiums are from the LTCI premium calculator, September 2009. 
https://www.ltcfeds.com/ltcWeb/do/assessing_your_needs/ratecalcOut 
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much higher on patients who pay privately. Therefore, good nursing homes compete by 
providing higher-quality care in order to attract more privately paying patients while, 
because of the excess demand for nursing homes, low-quality nursing homes have no 
incentive to improve their services because they can always accept Medicaid patients. 
Existing literature, such as Donoghue (2004), Nyman (1988), and Spector and Takada 
(1991), concluded that the quality of care provided by nursing homes with a high 
percentage of Medicaid patients is considerably lower, in terms of nurse-patient ratio, 
number of violations of the Medicaid certification codes per year, and physical 
environment. For instance, Donoghue (2004) found that for each percentage point 
increase in Medicaid patients in a nursing home the nurse-patient ratio decreased by 2 
percentage points.  
Because nursing homes usually accept as many privately paying patients as they can first 
and then fill their vacant beds with Medicaid patients (Scanlon, 1980; Nyman, 1988), 
privately paying patients can usually choose high-quality nursing homes or any nursing 
home they want to go to for personal reasons. Patients who are identified as Medicaid 
patients at the time of entering nursing homes, however, could find it difficult to obtain a 
spot at high-quality nursing homes. Therefore, Medicaid patients may suffer a disutility 
from low-quality care because they have to turn to any nursing home that accepts them.  
Nursing homes cannot require privately paying patients to leave when they exhaust their 
wealth and become eligible for Medicaid. Most likely, the patient would be transferred to 
the Medicaid wing of the nursing home. Literature shows that although there is a large 
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quality difference across nursing homes, the quality of care within nursing homes 
remains constant (Grabowski, Gruber, and Angelelli, 2008). Therefore, the key for older 
individuals is to enter a high-quality nursing home at the time they first need nursing 
home care. 
 
1.2.4 Literature 
There is substantial literature examining both supply- and demand-side explanations for 
the small LTCI market. Brown and Finkelstein (2007) calculated the actuarial fairness of 
LTCI premiums. Since premiums do not vary with gender but women have a larger 
chance of needing nursing homes and stay there longer, they found the premium is about 
50 percent unfair for males and approximately fair for females. However, there is no 
significant difference in LTCI coverage between men and women. Therefore, they 
concluded that the supply side reasons alone cannot explain the low demand for LTCI. 
Pauly (1990) provided theoretical explanations on why the non-purchase of LTCI could 
be rational under certain special circumstances. He illustrated that quality of care and 
bequest motives could be important in LTCI decisions. Brown, Coe, and Finkelstein 
(2007) and Brown and Finkelstein (2008) examined the crowd-out effect of public 
insurance. The former identified the Medicaid crowd-out effect by comparing LTCI 
coverage in different states that have different Medicaid asset test rules. They concluded 
that a decrease of $10,000 in the Medicaid asset test would increase the LTCI 
participation rate by 1.1 percentage point. The latter used a dynamic program to calculate 
8 
 
the willingness to pay for LTCI, assuming there is no bequest motive and identical 
quality for all nursing homes. They found that only the very wealthy would be willing to 
purchase LTCI. Davidoff (2008) offered another possible explanation: people use their 
illiquid houses to self-insure the cost of nursing homes. Using HRS data, he compared 
LTCI purchase and lapse decisions between people who live in areas experiencing larger 
or more modest house price increases. He found that people experiencing larger windfall 
gains in the housing market have a higher chance of lapsing LTCI. 
Although there is substantial literature on this topic, there is no paper that quantifies the 
significance and magnitude of the nursing home care quality preference, which could be 
used to explain the low demand for LTCI. Previous researchers often assume the quality 
of nursing homes is identical (Brown and Finkelstein, 2008; Ameriks, et al., 2009). The 
models also assume that the utility functions in the community and in nursing homes are 
the same. Therefore, individuals purchase LTCI in order to maintain a high level of 
consumption in nursing homes after paying for nursing home care, while Medicaid 
patients’ consumption would be at a much lower consumption floor. For example, it 
would assume that if a person typically spends $50,000 per year in the community, he or 
she would also want to spend that same amount in a nursing home. Medicaid recipients 
would be subject to a utility loss because they could not meet their desired consumption 
level. Brown and Finkelstein (2008) calibrated this consumption floor to be $515 per 
month, or $6,180 per year. Ameriks, et al. (2009) estimated a lower consumption floor of 
$4,400 per year for Medicaid patients. Such an assumption is questionable. General 
consumption includes durable and non-durable goods. When older individuals live in 
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nursing homes, demand for durable goods consumption surely vanishes. In addition, 
people in nursing homes generally have difficulties with at least two ADLs. The desire 
for non-durable goods, such as travel, clothes, or meals, is also arguably weak if a patient 
has trouble walking, dressing, or eating without assistance. Thus, it may not be 
reasonable to assume that an individual’s desired consumption in a nursing home is the 
same as that in the community. Therefore, this chapter assumes a zero marginal utility of 
general consumption in nursing homes. Individuals purchase LTCI to avoid losing utility 
in low-quality nursing homes, or to leave a larger inheritance. 
 
1.3 Two-Period Naïve Model 
In this section, a simple two-period naïve model and some numerical examples are 
presented to intuitively explore how the nursing home care quality preference parameter 
affects people’s behaviors, as well as to illustrate the impact of financial and housing 
assets on LTCI decisions. For simplicity, both the risk-free interest rate and the discount 
factor are assumed to be 1. It considers a rational single female household, maximizing 
her total utility over two periods. The individual is in good health and has an initial 
financial asset ܣ  and a house worth ܪ  in the first period. She does not have any form of 
income. It is assumed that there are two types of nursing homes: high and low quality. 
High-quality nursing homes provide better treatments but charge a higher price ܰܪ  
଴ ଴
௛
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which is set at $72,000 per year.6 Low-quality nursing homes cover only necessary 
treatment and examinations. They have a lower cost ܰܪ  which is set at $45,000 per 
year.
௟
஼భ
భషം
ଵିఊ
7 The LTCI is assumed to be a comprehensive policy and is actuarially fair priced. 
Assuming constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, the model could be 
formalized as:
  
Max ܷ ൌ ൅ ݏଷܾ
஻భ
భషം
ଵିఊ
൅ ݏଵ ൬
஼మ
భషം
ଵିఊ
൅ ܾ
஻మ
భషം
ଵିఊ
൰ ൅ ݏଶ ൬ܫሺܮሻݍ ൅ ܾ
஻ᇱమ
భషം
ଵିఊ
൰
ܲ ൌ ݏଶܰܪ௛
ܤଵ ൌ ܣ଴ ൅ ܪ଴ ൅ ܥଵ െ ܫሺܮܶܥܫሻܲ 
ܤଶ ൌ ܣ଴ ൅ ܪ଴ ൅ ܥଵ െ ܫሺܮܶܥܫሻܲ െ ܥଶ 
ܤଶᇱ ൌ ܫሺܮܶܥܫሻሺܣ଴ ൅ ܪ଴ െ ܥଵ െ ܲሻ
൅ ൫1 െ ܫሺܮܶܥܫሻ൯ ቀܫሺܮሻܪ଴
൅ maxሺ2, ܣ଴ ൅ ܫሺܪሻܪ଴ െ ܥଵ െ ܫሺܪሻܰܪ௛ െ ܫሺܮሻܰܪ௟ሻ൯ 
The nursing home care quality preference parameter ݍ is the focus of this chapter. ߛ is the 
ܾ  ݏଵ, ݏଶ ܽ݊݀ ݏଷ 
                                                           
 
Subject to:
  
 
CRRA coefficient; is the bequest motive coefficient; and are the 
probability that the individual is in good health, bad health, and dead at the end of the 
 
6 The national average rate for a private room in a nursing home in 2008, converted to 2006 dollars 
(MetLife, 2008). 
7 The national lower bound rate of a semiprivate room in a nursing home times the national average 
Medicaid reimbursement rate, converted to 2006 dollars (MetLife, 2008). 
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first period and in the second period, respectively. ܲ is the actuarially fair priced 
insurance premium for a comprehensive LTCI policy. ܥ are the consumption levels 
in the first and second period, respectively. ܤ  are bequests if the individual dies at the 
end of the first period. ܤ  are bequests if the individual is in a good health state in the 
second period and dead at the end of second period.  are bequests if the individual is in 
So we have ܫሺܪሻ ൅ ܫሺܮሻ ൌ 1 if the individual needs LTC in the second period. 
ଵ, ܥଶ 
ଵ
ଶ
ܤଶᇱ
a bad health state in the second period and dead at the end of the second period. 
ܫሺܮܶܥܫሻ is an indicator that equals to 1 if the individual decides to purchase LTCI in the 
first period; it is 0 otherwise. ܫሺܪሻ is an indicator that equals 1 if the individual enters a 
good-quality nursing home when she needs care; it is 0 otherwise. ܫሺܮሻ is an indicator 
that equals to 1 if the individual enters in a poor-quality nursing home; it is 0 otherwise. 
In the first period, she makes two decisions: how much to consume and whether to 
ion ܥଵ. 
d 
n in the seco
hi
fford the ex f a 
quality nursing home. In this case, she could choose either to enter a good-quality nursing 
purchase a LTCI policy. She receives her first-period utility from general consumpt
The state of her health could be one of three outcomes at the end of the first period: goo
health, bad health, and dead with probability ݏଵ, ݏଶ ܽ݊݀ ݏଷ respectively. If she is in good 
health, she makes only a consumption decisio nd period and continues to 
receive utility from general consumption ܥଶ. If she is in bad health, she has to enter a 
nursing home. Whether she could enter a gh-quality nursing home depends on her 
financial status. If she purchased LTCI in the first period, i.e., ܫሺܮܶܥܫሻ ൌ 1, she will 
definitely enroll in a high-quality nursing home. Or if she can a penditure o
high-quality nursing home, ܣ଴ ൅ ܪ଴ ൅ ܥଵ െ ܫሺܮܶܥܫሻܲ ൒ ܰܪ௛, she can enroll in a good-
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home, paying a higher cost t or-quality nursing home, 
paying a lower cost in order to leave a larger bequest for her heirs. If she cannot afford a 
high-quality nursing home, she has to enter a poor-quality facility. She will pay for the 
low-quality care until her financial assets drop to $2,000. Medicaid will then pay the 
remaining costs. In her state of bad health, she derives utility based on the quality of car
she receives. If she is accepted by a high-quality nursing home, either paid by LTCI o
with her own assets, she enjoys better services and receives a constant utility ܷ
o avoid the disutility, or enter a po
e 
r 
 each 
period she stays in the nursing home. If she is accepted by only a poor-quality nursing 
home, for each period she stays in the nursing home, she receives a constant utility ܷ, 
which is smaller than ܷ. Since both  ܷ and ܷ are constant for the household, it is the 
difference between  ܷ and ܷ that affects her LTCI purchase decision. To simplify the 
model, this chapter assumes that the i divid al would receive zero utility if she enters
high-quality nursing home and q utility if she enters a low-quality facility.
n u  a 
 8 So ݍ is the
difference between ܷ and  ܷ, which represents the utility loss from staying at a lower-
quality nursing home and is defined as the nursing home care quality preference
parameter in this ch r. If ameter is zero, it means there is no preference on type 
 
apte  this par
of nursing homes. A negative number indicates the individual is subject to utility loss if 
she enters a poor-quality nursing home. Furthermore, I assume this person’s utility from 
general consumption is zero in a state of bad health. The third possible health outcome at 
the end of the first period is that she dies and all remaining assets are transferred to her 
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8 This two-period model considers ݍ as a constant for simplicity. In the structural model, ݍ will vary based 
on the demographic information of households. 
heirs. The utility from the bequest is measured as last-period consumption times a 
scalar ܾ, which captures the strength of the bequest motive. At the end of the second 
period, she will surely die, and the remaining assets are left as bequests.  
good health in the second period are self-explanatory: the total assets min
The bequest when she dies at the end of the first period and the bequest when she is in 
us all outflows. 
es 
If the individual did not purchase LTCI in the first period but has enough money to pay 
for the care herself and chooses to do so, she does not pay the LTCI premium in the first 
If the individual enters a low-quality nursing home, Medicaid would pay the remaining 
cost after the individual exhausts her financial assets. As mentioned in previous section, 
the house is exempt from the Medicaid asset test. Therefore, in this case, the bequest is: 
ܤଶᇱ ൌ ܪ଴ ൅ maxሺ2, ܣ଴ ൅ ܫሺܪሻܪ଴ െ ܥଵ െ ܰܪ௟ሻ 
The bequest when the individual enters a nursing home in the second period, ܤଶᇱ , deserv
further explanation. In the case where LTCI was purchased in the first period and nursing 
home care is needed in the second period, LTCI will pay the entire cost. So all remaining 
assets from the first period will be left as the bequest: 
ܤଶᇱ ൌ ܣ଴ ൅ ܪ଴ െ ܥଵ െ ܲ 
period and pays the cost of high-quality nursing home in the second period. After 
entering a good-quality nursing home, she may run out of financial assets. Medicaid 
starts to pay when her financial assets drop to the $2,000 benchmark: 
ܤଶᇱ ൌ maxሺ2, ܣ଴ ൅ ܫሺܪሻܪ଴ െ ܥଵ െ ܰܪ௛ሻ 
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 1.3.1 The Effect of the Nursing Home Quality Preference Parameter 
In this subsection, some numerical experiments show the effect of ݍ, the nursing home 
care quality preference parameter. It assumes the CRRA coefficient is 2. Health 
ansitions are based on the estimated health transition matrix at age 99.9 To focus on the 
quality preference parameter, housing wealth and bequest motives are assumed to be zero 
in this subsection.  
1) ݍ=0 
ing 
ଵ ଶ
not afford a high-quality nursing home in the second period, 
s a low-quality nursing home without any penalty. So she should never 
Me id
ility 
 
                                                           
tr
This is a special case where the individual does not care about quality of nurs
home care. Purchasing LTCI simply reduces her utility from general consumption 
ܥ  and ܥ , but there is no utility gain if she enters a high-quality nursing home in the 
second period. If she can
she enter
purchase LTCI in this case, irrespective of her financial assets. She would also 
increase her consumption in the first period in order to enjoy the benefit from the 
dica  program in the second period. Figure 2 illustrates this effect with initial 
financial assets of $100,000. The X-axis shows the percent of total financial wealth 
consumed in the first period, and the Y-axis shows the corresponding expected ut
given she makes optimal decisions in the second period. In other words, if the 
individual is in good health, she is going to optimally balance her consumption and
 
9 Age-dependent health transition matrices are discussed further in the structural estimation section. 
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bequest. If she is in bad health, she will optimally choose nursing home type, if she
has the choice. It is clear that the peak of the utility curve when she does not purchas
LTCI is higher than the peak when she does. Thus, she should not purchase LTCI if 
she does not care about quality of care. 
 
2) ݍ =-0.1 
Now turn to the case where she has a modest care quality preference. Since she does 
not have a bequest motive, the LTCI dec
 
e 
ision will depend on whether the expected 
utility gain from entering a high-quality nursing home exceeds the utility loss from 
periods. This depends on the relative 
 quality preferences and her initial assets. Figure 3 demonstrates this 
0. 
rance 
given 
 
st 
lowering general consumption in both 
magnitudes of
effect, assuming ݍ =-0.1, and keeping the other parameters the same as the first 
scenario. Figure 3 (a) shows the utility curves given initial financial assets of $50,00
Since her asset level is low, the marginal utility of consumption is high. Therefore, 
the loss of utility from reducing general consumption in order to pay the insu
premium is larger than the expected utility gain from going to a better nursing home. 
She should not purchase LTCI in this case. Figure 3 (b) shows the utility curves 
initial assets of $100, 000. Comparing with the case above and ݍ =0 case (Figure 2), 
the disutility from staying at a low-quality nursing home dominates the utility lost as
a result of reducing general consumption to pay premiums. Therefore, unlike the fir
two cases, she is better off purchasing LTCI. Figure 3 (c) displays the utility curves 
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given initial assets of $150,000. In the figure, the utility curve of non-purchasing 
LTCI has two parts. There is a drop in expected utility at a 53 percent consumption 
rate. This means that if she consumes less than 53 percent of her initial assets in the 
first period, she has enough private funding to pay for good-quality nursing home 
care if needed in the second period. Because she has no bequest motive and no utility
from general consumption in a bad health state, there is no utility loss from self-
insuring. Thus, it is better for her not to purchase LTCI if her optimal consumption i
less than 53 percent of the initial financial wealth in the first period. However, if she 
consumes more than 53 percent of her initial financial wealth in the first period, he
assets in the second period are not enough for her to be accepted by a good nursing 
home. Therefore, she has to go into a poor-quality nursing home and is subject to
utility loss. In the second portion of this figure, in order to avoid this disutility, she 
would be better off purchasing LTCI. Taking a look at the whole picture, the peak of 
the non-purchasing LTCI utility curve occurs when the individual consumes 52 
percent of her initial financial wealth and is higher than the peak of the utility curve 
when she purchases LTCI. Therefore, a rich individual’s optimal choice is to forgo
LTCI protection. 
 
 ݍ
Figure 4 illustrates the effect with a more significant care quality preference 
parameter with the sam
 
s 
r 
 
 
3)  =-1 
e initial financial assets of Figure 3 (a), $50,000. Now she is 
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subject to a larger utility loss by entering a low-quality nursing home. With the same 
cial assets, the expected utility gain now exceeds the utility loss from 
reducing general consumption to pay the insurance premium. So we can observe that 
she now purchases LTCI, unlike in Figure 3 (a).   
In a
coe
imp  
LTC duals to avoid disutility from low-
quality nursing homes, as well as higher bequests if a bad state of health is realized in the 
second period.  
As mentioned in previous section, the model treats housing wealth differently from 
financial assets. In addition, to incorporate the well-known fact that people do not sell 
eir houses unless they receive a precipitating shock (Venti and Wise, 2001) such as 
r housing assets 
only at the time of entering a nursing home, when the demand for housing services drops 
to zero. To realize this, the model assumes housing assets do not generate direct utility, 
but the individual suffers an infinitely negative utility shock if she does not have a place 
to live, i.e., she is in good health and stays in the community but her house is sold for 
general consumption. Therefore, housing in the model has two functions. First, it can be 
initial finan
 more general case, neither quality preference parameters nor bequest motive 
fficients are 0. LTCI decisions are therefore more complicated. Purchasing LTCI 
lies lower consumption and bequests if she doesn’t need nursing home care. In return,
I provides better quality care, which allows indivi
 
1.3.2 The Difference between Financial Wealth and Housing Wealth 
th
entering a nursing home, this model allows the individual to liquidate he
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used as self-insurance against nursing home costs. Second, it can pass as a bequest. 
Figures 5 (a) and (b) compare LTCI decisions for two individuals of equal wealth. The 
individual in Figure 5 (a) has $100,000, all in financial assets. The individual in Figure 5 
(b) has $50,000 in financial assets and has a house worth another $50,000. It again 
assumes the same CRRA coefficient and health transition matrix. But to incorporate the 
bequest function of housing, it assumes the bequest motive coefficient is 1. Clearly t
two individuals make different LTCI decisions. The individual with a house decides not
to purchase LTCI but instead uses the house to self-insure the cost of a nursing home. 
Therefore, owning a house could also reduce the chance that an individual purchase
LTCI. 
 
1.4 The Structural Model 
1.4.1 Model Setup 
This se
he 
 
s 
ction considers a more sophisticated life-cycle model and estimates households’ 
ursing home care quality preference parameter using the HRS. In order to concentrate 
on LTCI and consumption decisions, it considers a single household10 and abstracts from 
odels only singles for two reasons. First, data on 
ests that 84 percent of nursing home residents are single (Hing, 
 
. 
                                                           
n
the retirement decision. This chapter m
LTC utilization sugg
1987). This is because couples usually take care of each other in their own homes. Thus,
being part of a couple significantly reduces the probability of needing nursing home care
 
10 Including never married, divorced, and widowed. 
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Second, by focusing on single households, the model can abstract from family structure 
dynamics, such as divorce, remarriage, or death of a spouse, as well as household 
preference aggregation and intra-household bargaining problems. Men and women ar
estimated separately rather than using one model and including a gender dummy. This is 
because the two groups have different characteristics, a dummy variable may not be able 
to capture the full effect. Although both female and male cases are considered, this 
chapter focuses more on single females. The women’s case is more interesting bec
they have a greater risk of requiring care and stay in nursing homes longer. Single wom
can also obtain actuarially fair priced LTCI (Brown and Finkelstein, 2007), ruling out the 
supply-side (i.e., unfair pricing) reason for not purchasing LTCI. Finally, the sample size 
of single females is much larger than the sample size of single males in the HRS, yie
more accurate estimates.
e 
ause 
en 
lding 
The single female agent enters the model at age 65 in good health, already retired. At 
௧
3X3 Markov transition matrix, as shown below:  
sଵଵ୲ sଵଶ୲ sଵଷ୲
where ݐ indicates the age of the individual. The nine elements represent the transition 
probabilities from good health (health=1), bad health (health=2), and death (health=3) at 
11 The male’s case is presented in subsection 1.4.8. 
later ages, she could be in one of three health states: good health (health=1), bad health 
(health=2), and dead (health=3). She faces age-dependent health transition matrices ܵ , a 
S୲ ൌ ቈ 0 sଶଶ୲ sଶଷ୲
0 0 1
቉, 
                                                            
11 The sample size for single females is 11,944 person-year observations; for males, there are 3,744 person-
year observations. 
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age ݐ to corresponding health states at age ݐ ൅ 1, respectively. In the bad state of health, 
the individual has to enter a nursing home, which is assumed to be an absorbing state as 
shown by ݏଶଵ௧ ൌ 0. In other words, it assumes no improvement or recovery based on the 
fact that very few long-term nursing home residents are discharged back to the 
community from nursing homes (Sekscenski, 1987; Keeler, Kane, and Solomon, 1981). 
 than
ly (1990) 
0 
e 
The model setting is very similar to the two-period model in the previous section. The 
individual makes consumption decisions ܥ௧ and LTCI decisions ܦ௧F F each period in a 
healthy state, in addition to decisions about which type of nursing home to go into, ௧ܰ,  
Keeler, Kane, and Solomon (1981) reported that only 8 to 12 percent of long-term 
nursing home residents are discharged back to the community. Short-term nursing home 
residents have very different characteristics  long-term residents. They are most 
likely post-acute-care patients from hospitals12 and get well in a fairly short time. Since 
this chapter focuses on long-period nursing home stays that could be covered by LTCI, 
the increment of this chapter is one year, so it takes the same assumption as Pau
that LTC is an absorbing state. Death is also an absorbing state, so ݏଷଵ௧ and ݏଷଶ௧are both 
and ݏଷଷ௧ is 1. The terminal period T is set at 100. Therefore, the maximum period th
individual could stay in the model is 36 years.  
13
14
                                                            
12 Over 80 percent of short-term nursing home residents are from hospitals. Only ercent ong-term  27 p  of l
nursing home residents are from hospitals. The majority of them (43 percent) are from private residences, 
according to Keeler, Kane, and Solomon (1981). 
13 If s 0, it means the individual decides to forgo the protection from LTCI. If it is 1, the individual 
decides to purchase or keep holding LTCI at current period t. 
est. 
 tD  i
14 If tN  is 1, it means the individual decides to obtain high-quality care and pays a higher cost to avoid 
disutility from a low-quality nursing home. If it is 2, it indicates the individual decides to go to a low-
quality nursing home in order to leave a larger bequ
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at the time of needing LTC, given the condition that she does not hold LTCI and has 
enough resources to be accepted by high-quality nursing homes. These three decisions 
form the decision space of the model, i.e., ݀ ൌ ሼܥ , ܦ ,ܰ ሽ. The person makes decisions 
based on her vector of state variables ܺ ൌ ሼܽ݃݁, ݄݈݁ܽݐ݄ , ܣ , ܪ , ܫܰܥ , ܲ ሽ, which is a 
combination of demographic variables and current financial states. ܽ݃݁ is the age of the 
individual at period ݐ; ݄݈݁ܽݐ݄ is her health status at time ݐ; ܣ௧ and ܪ௧ are financial and 
housing assets she holds at the beginning of period ݐ, respectively. The individual 
receives a constant real income ܫܰܥ௧. She pays insurance premium ௦ܲ௧ for keeping the 
insurance policy active, where ݏ indicates in which period she purchased LTCI and ݐ 
riod. This chapter assumes there is only one 
ܧܸܲሺܾ݂݁݊݁݅ݐሻ ൌ ܧܸܲሺ݌ݎ݁݉݅ݑ݉ሻ ֜ 
் ௜ିଵ ்்
൫1 ൅ ∑ ߚ ∏ ݏଵଵ௝௜ୀ௦ ൯
௧ ௧ ௧ ௧
௧ ௧ ௧ ௧ ௧ ௦௧
indicates how much she pays in the current pe
type of LTCI in the market, which is a comprehensive insurance policy. It pays a 
maximum daily benefit of $20015 for an unlimited benefit period, with automatic 
inflation protection. It is priced at an actuarially fair value, so, 
௦ܲ௧ ൌ
ܰܪ௛൫ݏଵଶ௦ ∑ ߚ௝ି௦ݏଶଶ௝ ൅௝ୀ௦ାଵ ∑ ߚ
௜ି௦൫∏ ݏଵଵ௝௝ୀ௦ ൯ݏଵଶ௜ ∑ ߚ
௝ି௦ݏଶଶ௝௜ାଵ௜ୀ௦ାଵ ൯
௜ି௦ ௜
௝ୀ௦
்  
The agent maximizes her expected lifetime utility: 
ܧ଺ହ෍ ߚ௧ି଺ହ ቈܫሺ݄݃௧ሻ ቆ
ܥ௧
ଵିఊ
1 െ ߛ
ቇ ൅ ܫሺܾ݄௧ሻܫሺܮ௧ሻݍ௧ ൅ ܫሺ݀݅݁݀௧ሻܾ
ܤ௧
ଵିఊ
1 െ ߛ
቉
்
 
௧ୀ଺ହ
                                                            
15 $72,000 annually, which is the cost of high-quality nursing homes. 
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 where  is the time discount factor,  is the CRRA coefficient, and ߚ ߛ ܾ is the bequest 
motive coefficient. The care quality preference parameter, ݍ௧, is the focus of this chapter. 
In this structural model, ݍ௧ is set as a function of the individual’s income and age. So 
ݍ௧ ൌ ߠ଴ ൅ ߠଵܫܰܥ௧ ൅ ߠଶܽ݃݁ ൅ ߠଷܽ݃݁ଶ 
y people suffer from being treated in 
low-quality nursing homes. Income could be viewed as Social Security income, which is 
a good proxy for an individual’s life style. ߠଵ is expected to be negative, because for the 
same level of quality, an individual who usually lives a more comfortable life in the 
community may feel life changes more dramatically and therefore is subject to a larger 
ଶ here 
deteriorate, they may suffer a larger utility loss each period. The sign of ߠଷ, the 
coefficient on age squared, is expected to be positive. It is interesting to have it here 
be
i
re 
ld LTCI or pass the financial 
ߠ଴ is expected to be negative, since it is the disutilit
utility loss. The coefficient on age, ߠ , is expected to be negative. The main concern 
is the individual’s physical conditions. At the same level of care, younger and stronger 
people may suffer a smaller disutility. As people age and their physical conditions 
cause when people are very old and severely ill, they may not be as aware of their 
surroundings as younger individuals. Therefore, they suffer a smaller disutility.  
In the good health state, ܫሺ݄݃௧ሻ ൌ 1, the ind vidual receives utility from general 
consumption ܥ௧, in the LTC state, ܫሺܾ݄௧ሻ ൌ 1. The structural model assumes her desi
for general consumption vanishes. The individual receives zero utility if she enters a 
good-quality nursing home. The individual could either ho
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test for entry into high-quality nursing homes: the present value of her private funding is 
higher than the expected cost, i.e.,16 
ܣ௧ ൅ ܪ௧ ൅෍ ߚ௞ି௧ݏଶଶ௞ܫܰܥ௧
்
൒෍ ߚ௞ି௧ݏଶଶ௞ܰܪ௛
்
 
Otherwise, the individual goes to a low-quality nursing home and receives disutility f
ܧܸܲሺܽݏݏ݁ݐݏሻ ൒ ܧܸܲሺܿ݋ݏݐݏሻ ֜ 
௞ୀ௧ ௞ୀ௧
rom 
being cared from there, which is represented by the coefficient of care quality 
௧ ௧
௧ሻ ൅ ܫሺܾ݄௧ ௧
The individual is subject to the following budget constraints. Since it is easier to 
understand when presented separately, budget constraints are listed case by case. In the 
healthy state, the budget constraint for the individual is: 
ܣ௧ାଵ ൌ ሺܣ௧ ൅ ܫܰܥ௧ െ ܦ௧ ௦ܲ௧ െ ܥ௧ሻ ௙ܴ 
The only inflow is income, and outflows are based on her decisions about how much to 
consume and whether to purchase LTCI. Financial assets grow by the risk-free rate ௙ܴ, 
and housing assets are assumed to be constant over time.  
ters a 
good-quality nursing home, which is fully paid for by LTCI. Given the assumption that 
                                                           
preference ݍ . If the individual is dead, ܫሺ݀݅݁݀ ሻ ൌ 1, her remaining assets are treated as 
the bequest. For each period, ܫሺ݄݃ ሻ ൅ ܫሺ݀݅݁݀ ሻ ൌ 1. 
At the time the individual needs LTC, if she holds LTCI, i.e., ܦ௧ିଵ ൌ 1, she en
 
16 In reality, every nursing home has unique rules to decide who they accept. This is the best way to 
generalize the entrance rules. 
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she does not have general consumption, is zero. So in this case, her budget 
constraint is:  
 the outflow 
ܤ௧ ൌ ܣ௧ ൅ ܪ௧ ൅ ܫܰܥ௧ 
She could also enter a high-quality nursing home and pay for it privately. As mentioned 
 
 at the period they enter the 
nursing home,  
ses. She will remain in the same nursing home after she runs out of assets 
and Medicaid will pay the rest of the expenses. Therefore, her budget constraint is: 
and the bequest she leaves to her heirs is: 
ܣ௧ାଵ ൌ ሺܣ௧ ൅ ܫܰܥ௧ሻ ௙ܴ, 
and she can leave all of her remaining assets and house to her heirs, so, 
in the previous section, a house is considered an additional channel to pay for the cost of
a nursing home. It will be sold upon entrance to a nursing home, at which time the 
individual’s demand for housing services drops to zero. So
ܣ௧ ൌ ܣ௧ ൅ ܪ௧. 
In this case, she incurs expenditure in a high-quality nursing home on out-of-pocket 
medical expen
ܣ௧ାଵ ൌ max ሺ2, ܣ௧ ൅ ܫܰܥ௧ െ ܰܪ௛ሻ ௙ܴ, 
ܤ௧ ൌ maxሺ2, ܣ௧ ൅ ܫܰܥ௧ െ ܰܪ௛ሻ. 
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If she does not hold LTCI and is not eligible for good-quality nursing home care, or
chooses not to enter a good-quality nursing home in order to leave a larger bequest, she
would go to a po
 
 
or-quality nursing home, which has a lower cost and lower quality of 
care. If she enters a poor-quality nursing home, selling her house is not optimal, since it is 
exempt from the Medicaid asset test. Therefore, she will pay the costs for a low-quality 
er 
ܣ௧ାଵ ൌ max ሺ2, ܣ௧ ൅ ܫܰܥ௧ െ ܰܪ௟ሻ ௙ܴ, 
and her bequest will be: 
ܤ௧ ൌ maxሺ2, ܣ௧ ൅ ܫܰܥ௧ െ ܰܪ௟ሻ ൅ ܪ௧. 
 
ll 
hapter 
adopts the two-step method of simulated moments procedure generally used in the 
                                                           
nursing home until her financial assets reach $2,000 and Medicaid will pay the rest. H
house will be left to heirs as a bequest. Her budget constraint in this case is: 
1.4.2 Estimation Method 
The objective of the estimation is to find a preference parameter vector ߠ෠ that makes 
simulated moments best match the data moments from the HRS. Since this chapter 
focuses on the financial decisions of LTCI, the moments to be matched in the chapter wi
be LTCI coverage by income decile, by financial asset decile, and by ratio of housing to 
total wealth of middle-class households.17 To estimate the coefficients, this c
 
17  defined as individuals whose total wealth falls in the third quintile of total  Middle-class households are
wealth distribution. 
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economic literature, such as French and Jones (2004) and De Nardi, French, and Jones 
(2006). It separately estimates parameters describing individuals’ beliefs and those 
describing preferences. 
The HRS is a national representative panel first interviewed in 1992 and originally 
comprising over 7,000 individuals born between 1931 and 1941 and their spouses of any 
survey, the Asset and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD), which started in 
were added in 1998, and the Early Baby Boomers (EBB) were added in 2004. The panel 
was re-interviewed every two years, the latest data being for 2006. The dataset contains 
detailed information on household demographics, family structure, financial and housing 
ealth, and LTCI coverage. This chapter makes use of data from wave 3 (1996) to wave 
6) as in Finke  The first two waves are dropped because 
the wordings of questions about LTCI are quite different, resulting in much lower 
reported coverage rates.18 LTCI coverage is measured by an indicator that takes the value 
1 if, at the interview date, the individual holds a LTCI policy covering nursing home cost, 
0 otherwise. This chapter pools the 6 waves and retains retired, non-institutionalized 
single women aged between 65 and 100, leaving 16,778 individual-year observations. 
 
1.4.3 HRS Data Profile 
age. Individuals born before 1924 were merged into the HRS in 1996 from a different 
1993. Younger cohorts, the Children of Depression Age (CODA) and War Babies (WB), 
w
8 (200 lstein and McGarry (2006).
                                                            
18 See Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) for detail. 
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Non-housing financial assets are defined as the sum of all forms of financial assets, 
including checking, savings, and money market accounts, plus the value of CDs, stocks 
and bonds. Housing wealth is defined as self-reported housing wealth minus mortgage 
debt. Income is self-reported household income. Since the model imposes a no-borrowing
constraint, this chapter further eliminates observations with negative financial or housing 
wealth, leaving a total sample size of 11,944 individual-year observations.
 
verage 
le is 
t 
el in 
e 
 
                                                           
19 The 
summary statistics are presented in Table 2, columns 1 and 2. The sample LTCI co
is 9.8 percent, which is close to the overall coverage rate in the HRS. Figure 6 shows 
LTCI coverage by income decile. The pattern is very clear: LTCI coverage increases 
monotonically with income. Coverage among individuals in the bottom income quinti
less than 3 percent, compared with 7 to 8 percent in the third income quintile, and abou
20 percent in the top quintile. This pattern seemingly contradicts the two-period mod
which the very wealthy should not purchase LTCI. The reason for this is, again, the 
quality of the nursing homes and the positively correlated nursing home cost.20 In the 
two-period model, I assume there are two types of nursing homes, high quality and low 
quality. The cost of the first kind is assumed to be the national average, 72,000 dollars 
per year. Although this type of nursing home provides care that is acceptable to th
majority population, it may not be acceptable to the wealthy. They might prefer to pay 
more and enter a better quality, more expensive nursing home.21 This means that the 
relative ratio of assets to nursing home cost declines. In other words, they are not rich
 
 Lifeplans (2007) found the maximum daily of LTCI contract benefit is highly positive correlated to an 
individual’s income. 
 high as $577 per day, or $210,605 annually (MetLife, 
19 4,774 households. 
20
21 Some top-quality nursing homes could charge as
2008). 
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enough to enter these top-quality nursing homes. So it becomes optimal for them to 
purchase a LTCI policy with a higher maximum daily benefit22 to hedge the higher 
financial cost. Since the very wealthy have a very limited chance of using Medicaid, 
structural model keeps the assumption that there are only two types of nursing homes a
the simulated matching process only matches the moment of first 8 income deciles. 
Sample LTCI coverage is 7.0 percent for the first 8 income deciles. 
The second set of moments used to estimate the preference parameter is LTCI coverage 
and LTCI coverage is similar to that for income, as Figure 7 shows. Higher financial 
wealth is associated with higher coverage rates. In the lowest quintile, LTCI coverage is 
less than 3 percent, compared with 8 percent in the third and about 20 percent in the top 
quintile. For the same reasons, only moments from the first 8 f nancial asset deciles ar
A third set of moments is LTCI coverage by ratio of housing wealth to total assets, w
the ratio is defined as housing assets over total assets, which are the 
the 
nd 
rates by financial wealth decile. As expected, the relationship between financial wealth 
i e 
used in the estimation process. 
here 
summation of 
housing assets and financial assets. Using this set of moments allows me to examine the 
total wealth, households with greater housing wealth are less likely to purchase LTCI, it 
                                              
hypothesis that people use their houses to self-insure the cost of LTC. If, controlling for 
could be because they are prepared to use housing wealth to pay for the cost. Since 
people retain their houses until they enter nursing homes, people who have more 
               
22 The maximum daily benefit could reach as high as $500 per day in the current market: 
(https://www.ltcfeds.com/ltcWeb/do/assessing_your_needs/ratecalcOut, checked in August 2009) 
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expensive houses are better self-insured for LTC needs than their counterparts, and 
therefore less likely to purchase LTCI. Figure 8 shows LTCI coverage by ratio of housing
wealth to total wealth for individuals who are homeowners and whose total assets are in 
the third total wealth quintile. T
 
he downward sloping trend is as expected, although the 
ଵଵ ଵଶ ଵଷ
0 0 1
1 െ zଵt zଵt ൬
first two moments show a strange pattern. This is because the cell sizes for the two 
moments are very small. In the subsample, median total wealth is only $87,000. 
Therefore, if the ratio is less than 10 percent, it means the house is worth less than $8,700. 
This is unlikely to happen in reality, and only 10 individuals fall in this category. 
Similarly, only 18 individuals fall in the second category. Therefore, the first two 
moments are dropped in the estimation process.  
 
1.4.4 Parameter Estimates 
The first step is to estimate age-dependent health transition matrices S୲. The process 
follows Ameriks, et al. (2009):  
S୲ ൌ ቈ
s s s
0 sଶଶ sଶଷ቉ ൦
ୣ ୣ Zଶ
1 ൅ Zଶ
൰ zଵt ൬ୣ
1
1 ൅ Zଶ
൰
 
3) to 
3) at 66, respectively. As mentioned in 
the previous section, LTC and dead are absorbing states, so sଶଵ, sଷଵ, and sଷଶ are 0 and 
0 1 െ zଵtୣ zଵtୣ
0 0 1
൪ 
The first matrix is the baseline health transition matrix for age 65. s୨୩ indicates the
probabilities of moving from good health (j=1), bad health (j=2), and dead at 65 (j=
good health (k=1), bad health (k=2), and dead (k=
30 
 
sଷଷ is 1. Furthermore, it is obvious that ∑ ݏ௝௞ ൌ 1ଷ௞ୀଵ . Therefore, there are a total of three 
eters to be estim  second matrix is the age adjustment 
matrix. It shifts the probabilities from better health states to worse health states as people 
 two parameters, ܼଵ, ܼଶ , to be estimated in this matrix. 
To estimate these parameters, this model simulated 100,000 households at 65 in a good 
health state. They receive idiosyncratic health shocks drawn from the distribution 
described by the above health transition matrices. The objective is to minimize the 
at
r re n
conditional on using a nursing hom  life expectancy in the good health state 
at age 65, 75, 85, and 95. Moments of LTC utilization come from Brown and Finkelstein 
(2008). Moments of life expectancies are calculated based on the SSA life table for 
women born in 1935. The comparisons of data moments and simulated moments are 
listed in Table 1, column 1 and 2, respectively. The moments are matched fairly well, 
indicating the estimated age-dependent health transition matrices are correctly specified. 
 the 
t 
factor is 0.97, the CRRA coefficient is 2, and the bequest motive coefficient is set to 1 in 
param ated in the first matrix. The
age. ݁ is the curvature that indicates the adjustment speed. It is set at 1.5 following 
Ameriks, et al. (2009). There are
distance between the moments generated by the health transition m rices and the 
moments of LTC utilization and life expectancy in the data. The data moments used for 
estimation are: the probability of ever using nursing home, average age of first entry, 
length of stay, and the probability of using a nursing home fo mo  than o e year (all 
e), as well as
The second step is to estimate the vector of quality preference parameters, ߠ, taking the 
health transition matrices S୲ as given. In order to simplify the estimation, I calibrate
rest of the parameters. The risk-free interest rate is assumed to be 1.03, the discoun
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the baseline estimation. People are heterogeneous in six dimensions: age, health status, 
financial assets, housing assets, income, and insurance premiums that need to be paid 
they decide to purchase LTCI in the current period. Decision rules will be solved by 
standard dynamic programming solutions, where the lifetime utility function is rewritten 
in the form of a Bellman equation: 
ሺ ሻ
ௗ೟
ሺ ሻ ሾ ሺ ሻ ሿ
So the multi-period model now can be solved by backward induction. At period T, since 
individuals know they are going to die at the end of this period, they will choose the 
if 
௧ܸ ܺ௧ ൌ maxܷ ܺ௧, ݀௧; ܵ௧, ߠ ൅ ܧ ௧ܸାଵ ܺ௧ାଵ |ܺ௧, ݀௧; ܵ௧, ߠ  
optimal consumption rate to balance consumption and bequests and maximize their last-
period utility. They are not going to purchase LTCI, since they have no chance of 
needing nursing home care in the future. Solving the value function backward, each 
period people make their consumption and LTCI decisions in a good health state, and 
decide which type of nursing home to enter if in a bad health state, ݀௧ ൌ ሼܥ௧, ܦ௧, ௧ܰሽ, 
based on their current state, ܺ௧ ൌ ሼܽ݃݁, ݄݈݁ܽݐ݄௧, ܣ௧, ܪ௧, ܫܰܥ௧, ௦ܲ௧ሽ, to maximize the 
summation of their current-period utility and expected discounted utility for the 
remaining periods until the termination period T. Doing the same procedure until the first 
period that individuals enter the model will produce a full set of decision rules. Having 
the decision profiles, simulated moments can be computed. The goal is to adjust the 
vector of preference parameters ߠ  to match the simulated m ments to the data moments, 
i.e., 
o
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ߠ෠ ൌ min
ఏ
݃ሺߠ, ܵሻᇱௐ
షభ
݃ሺߠ, ܵሻ, 
where ݃ሺߠ, ܵሻ is the vector of distances between simulated moments and data moments 
and W is the weighting matrix.  
listed in column 2. The estimated intercept of the quality preference param
The negative sign on the inte
disutility when they have to enroll in low-quality nursing homes. The estimated 
coefficient on income23 is -0.0015. The negative coefficient on income is also as 
expected. It shows that individuals who usually live a more comfortable life are subject 
a larger utility loss when they receive low-quality nursing home care. Intuitively, low
middle-income individuals may regard the living conditions in low-quality nursing homes 
as ac
The estimated coefficients on the nursing home care quality preference parameter of the 
baseline model are presented in Table 3, column 1. The corresponding standard errors are 
eter is -0.1121. 
rcept is as expected, indicating individuals are subject to 
to 
- to 
ceptable, albeit not ideal. However, wealthy individuals would experience a 
dramatic decrease in their standard of living on entry to a low-quality nursing home. 
Therefore, they lose more utility on entry to low-quality nursing homes. The coefficient 
ey enter low-quality nursing homes. The coefficient on 
age square is positive, however, insignificantly different from 0, suggesting that the age 
effect is roughly linear. 
 
on age is -0.0106.  The negative sign shows older and more frail individuals plausibly 
suffer a larger utility loss when th
To interpret the overall effect of care quality preference parameter, consider a woman 
with a median annual income ($16,761) enters a low-quality nursing home at age 84,24
                                                            
23 In thousands. 
24 The average age a female first uses a nursing home. 
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the average age of first time entry. Her marginal utility loss each period of staying
low-quality nursing home is 0.1893. If we assume her general consumption in a good 
health state is her total income ($16,761) in each period, a marginal utility loss of 0.1893 
is equivalent to a drop of $12,744 in general consumption, from $16,761 to $4,017. 
Compared with the cost differential between high- and low-quality care, the estim
quality preference parameter for a median-income individual shows a modest willingn
to pay for LTCI. With a positive Medicaid implicit tax,
 at a 
ated 
ess 
s 
er 
coverage rate in the data. 
                                                           
25 it further reduces the 
individual’s interest in purchasing LTCI. Therefore, this confirms the argument by 
Brown and Finkelstein (2008) that Medicaid crowd-out is an explanation for non-
purchase LTCI.  
 
1.4.5 Model Fit 
Figure 9 compares data and simulated LTCI coverage by income decile. The simulated 
moments do a fairly good job of matching moments from the HRS. The model capture
the key feature that LTCI coverage increases monotonically with individuals’ income. In 
the lowest tail of income distribution, LTCI coverage is below 3 percent. At the high
end, LTCI coverage is close to 20 percent. In addition, the simulated overall LTCI 
coverage for the first eight income deciles is 6.8 percent, very close to the 7.0 percent 
 
25 The concept of a Medicaid implicit tax is introduced in Brown and Finkelstein (2008). It measures the 
 that would otherwise be paid by Medicaid if the individual had forgone LTCI percent of LTC cost
protection. 
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Figure 10 compares data and simulated LTCI coverage by financial assets decil
the graph, we can see the simulated moments fit the data well except the top two dec
which show a downward pattern. This is as expected, since the model has only two
of nursing homes
e. From 
iles, 
 types 
. People who enter higher-quality nursing homes are not subject to any 
herefore, wealthy people could easily pay the cost of this type of nursing 
home without a utility loss. LTCI is not necessary for them. However, very wealthy 
 may find this kin ng home still not acceptable. They would 
ealth 
 
s who have a more expensive house are less likely to purchase 
disutility. T
people d of good-quality nursi
enter an even better quality nursing home with even higher costs. This feature leads to a 
lower wealth-LTCI cost ratio and stimulates LTCI purchase among wealthy individuals 
in reality.  
Figure 11 compares data and simulated moments of LTCI coverage by the ratio of 
housing to total wealth, controlling for total wealth.26 The key feature of housing w
in LTCI decisions are again fitted pretty well. The general trend shows that, controlling
for total wealth, individual
LTCI. When housing wealth accounts for 30 to 40 percent of total wealth, more than 20 
percent of individuals hold LTCI. When housing wealth accounts for over 60 percent of 
their total wealth, LTCI coverage falls below 5 percent.  
 
1.4.6 The Effect of Housing Wealth 
                                                            
26 Total assets are controlled at the third total assets quintile. 
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Two factors may contribute to lower LTCI coverage rates as the ratio of housing-to-total-
wealth increases. First, people may use housing to self-insure nursing home costs. Secon
as shown in Figure 7, LTCI coverage increases monotonically with individuals’ financial
wealth. Wh
d, 
 
en controlling for total wealth, increases in the ratio of housing-to-total wealth 
27
odation when she is in a good 
health state and fulfill the bequest needs when she is dead. It cannot be used as self-
surance against nursing home expenditures. If the hypothesis is true, simulated LTCI 
ge should inc who have higher-value 
houses.  
 the 
 
 
                                                           
mean decreases in financial assets. Therefore, drops in LTCI coverage could be the 
consequence of lower financial assets. To further explore the true effect of housing 
wealth on LTCI decisions, this chapter does an experiment that prevents people from 
using their housing wealth to pay for nursing home cost. I assume that the individual 
keeps living in her house, but the ownership is transferred to her heirs as soon as she 
enters the model. The utility from bequests  is still received at the period when the 
individual dies. Therefore, the house will serve as accomm
in
covera rease for homeowners, especially those 
The impact of this experiment is very clear. The simulated population LTCI holding rate 
in the first eight income deciles is now 12.6 percent. This is an increase of 5.8 percentage 
points, or 85.3 percent, from the baseline results.  Figure 12 shows the effect by income 
decile. LTCI coverage increases in all income deciles, especially in the upper part of
income distribution. In the first decile, simulated LTCI coverage increases from 0.33
percent to 0.42 percent, or 27.3 percent. In the eighth decile, simulated LTCI coverage
 
of the house. 27 The amount will be remaining financial assets plus the total value 
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increases from 18.5 percent to 34.8 percent, an increase of 88.1 percent. Since there is
large positive correlation between income and housing assets, low-income people are 
likely to own a large house. Therefore, the housing effect for them is negligible. High
income people usually have higher-value houses. Preventing them from using their house 
to pay for care reduces their preparedness for nursing home costs. Thus, they purcha
LTCI in order to avoid low-quality nursing homes. LTCI coverage by financial wealth 
deciles shows exactly the same effect. Simulated LTCI coverage increases for all 
financial 
 a 
less 
-
se 
wealth deciles and the wealthy respond more significantly. Figure 13 shows the 
 
of housing. Because housing assets cannot be liquidated and used for consumption, the 
responses of individuals in the third wealth quintile varies depending on the ratio of 
housing to total wealth. Clearly, the effect is negligible when housing wealth is small. For 
example, the LTCI coverage rate increases from 16.2 percent to 18.9 percent for 
individuals whose housing wealth accounts for less than 30 percent of total wealth, an 
increase of merely 16.7 percent. When housing represents a larger proportion of total 
wealth, simulated LTCI coverage increases dramatically. If housing comprises 60 to 70 
percent of total wealth, the simulated LTCI coverage increases from 3.3 percent to 22.7 
percent, an increase of 19.4 percentage points, or 584.3 percent. Finally, there is only a 
modest increase in the coverage rate for households with most of their wealth in the form
reduction in consumption resulting from the purchase of LTCI would result in a large 
reduction in utility. Therefore, these individuals are less likely to purchase LTCI. 
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To sum up, the experiment proves the hypothesis that some older individuals use their 
housing assets to self-insure the cost of nursing homes, which is consistent with Davi
(2008). 
 
1.4.7 Robustness Check 
The benchmark model adopts the bequest motive coefficient of 1, which is in line with 
French and Jones (2004). However, there is extensive literature that argues that the 
bequest motive of older households may not be very strong. Therefore, in many studies,
such as Brown and Finkelstein (2008) and Davidoff (2009), a 0 bequest motive 
coefficient in the baseline model is assumed. To incorporate this argument, this chapter 
re-estimates the model, setting the bequest motive coefficient to 0. Under this assumption, 
people’s behaviors are not affected by the bequest they leave for their heirs. This f
doff 
 
urther 
t to purchase LTCI is because they want to enter high-quality nursing homes. In 
this case, if their total wealth is sufficient to qualify them for entry into a high-quality 
enter a high-quality nursing home, since they 
no utility loss st. To match the same level of LTCI 
. 
reduces the motives for individuals to purchase LTCI, given the assumption that 
individuals in nursing homes obtain no utility from general consumption. The only reason 
they wan
nursing home, they will definitely choose to 
suffer  from leaving a lower beque
coverage in the HRS, I expect the level of care quality preference parameter to increase
In other words, I expect a larger utility loss if an individual enters a low-quality nursing 
home. So there will be more individuals who decide to purchase LTCI in order to enter 
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high-quality nursing homes. This will offset the decrease in LTCI coverage from
who originally purchase LTCI because they want to leave a sizable bequest. Table 3, 
column 3 reports the estimated coefficients. Corresponding standard errors are reported in 
column 4. As expected, the magnitude of interception of the care quality preference 
parameter becomes larger in this case, increasing from -0.1121 to -0.1218. The 
coefficients on all other three covariates barely change. The coefficients on income, age, 
and age squared are -0.0015, -0.0107, and 0.0003, respectively, compared with -0.0015, -
0.0106, and 0.0004, respectively, for the baseline estimation. This indicates the estimat
are robust under a reasonable range of bequest motive coefficients.  
 
1.4.8 Care Quality Preference Parameter Estimates for Men 
Using the same estimation method, this chapter estimates the corresponding parameter 
for single males. It first estimates age-dependent health transition matrices. Comparison 
of data moments and simulated LTC utilization and life expectancy are presented in 
Table 1, column 3 and column 4. Again the matches are close, indicating the health 
transition probabilities are correctly estimated. After having health transition matrice
the same method is processed again to estimate the parameter for males. The on
difference is that the LTCI premium has a 0.5 load for men (Brown and Finkelstein, 
2007). The 0.5 load means the policyholder can get only 50 cents in expected present 
value of benefits for each dollar paid for the insurance premium. Therefore, the premium 
formula for men is: 
 people 
es 
s, 
ly 
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௦ܲ௧ ൌ 0.5 כ
ேு೓ቀ௦భమೞ ∑ ఉ ௦మమೕାೕసೞశభ ∑ ఉ ቀ∏ ௦భభೕೕసೞ ቁ௦భమ೔ ∑ ఉ೔శభ೔సೞశభ
ቀଵା∑ ఉ೔షೞ ∏ ௦೔೅ ቁ
ೕషೞ೅ ೔షೞ ೔షభ ೕషೞ௦మమೕ
೅೅ ቁ
భభೕೕసೞ೔సೞ
. 
ated coefficients of nursing home care quality preference are listed in Table 3 
column 5, along with corresponding standard errors listed in column 6. The sign of the 
intercept is again negative as expected, which indicates that single males are also subject 
to utility loss when they enter low-quality nursing homes. However, the magnitude is 
smaller than that for single women. The coefficient on income is also negative as 
expected, which shows men who live a more comfortable life experience a larger utility 
loss when staying at low-quality nursing homes. Therefore, it shows wealthy individuals 
are more likely to purchase LTCI, keeping all other conditions constant. The magnitude 
The matched moments are again LTCI coverage by the first eight income deciles, LTCI 
coverage by the first eight financial wealth deciles, and LTCI coverage by the ratio of 
housing wealth to total wealth for men in the third wealth quintile. After applying the 
same sample selection criteria that were applied to women, the sample includes 3,744 
person-year observations. The summary statistics are presented in Table 2, column 3 and 
column 4. The population LTCI coverage from data is 7.6 percent and 5.9 percent for the 
first eight income deciles, both smaller than women’s, although the differences are 
modest. This could be because single males are usually richer than single females, or that 
they have a different pattern of nursing home care quality preference. 
 
The estim
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of this coefficient is very close to that for single women (-0.0012 vs. -0.0015). The 
coefficient on age is negative as expected, and the magnitude of this coefficient is larger 
than that for women. This means that as time goes by, men are subject to a larger utility 
uld be because men usually have shorter life expectancy than women and are 
in worse health at any given age. The coefficient on age square is again close to 0, 
 
ch 
ent 
                                                           
loss. This co
indicating a linear relationship between care quality preference and age. The disutility of
a median-income male ($22,935) who enters a nursing home at age of 8328 is 0.8806 ea
period, larger than the comparable number for women, 0.1893. Therefore, the disutility 
for men staying at low-quality nursing homes is larger than for women. This explains 
why LTCI coverage rates are similar, although the insurance premiums are 50 perc
unfair for men.  
 
1.5 Policy Experiment 
Policymakers would like to encourage individuals to purchase private LTCI in order to 
reduce Medicaid expenditures. Using the estimated preference parameter, this section 
does counterfactual experiments to explore how people would respond to different 
government policies designed to stimulate the LTCI market and reduce Medicaid 
expenditures. 
 
 
28 The average age males first use nursing homes.  
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1.5.1 Government subsidy on LTCI premium 
Since over 50 percent of non-purchasers say the main reason why they do not purchase 
TCI is because it “costs too much” (Lifeplans, 2007), the first potential public policy I 
ine is a governm ent, I assume the government will 
provide a generous 20 percent subsidy for LTCI premiums. In other words, when 
 
 
crease 
ome deciles. With the government subsidies, 
TCI becomes a better-value product. The utility loss from general consumption is 
smaller, but the utility gain in the case where LTC is needed remains unchanged. For 
wealthier individuals, the demand for private LTCI almost doubles. For the eighth 
s for 
ely 
L
exam ent subsidy. In this experim
individuals purchase LTCI, they pay 80 percent of the insurance premium. The other 20
percent will be paid by government. This experiment holds all other assumptions constant.
Figure 14 and Figure 15 display how simulated LTCI coverage would change after 
enacting the policy. From Figure 14, we can see simulated LTCI coverage rates in
for all income deciles, especially higher-inc
L
income decile, the simulated LTCI coverage rate increases from 18.8 percent to above 
41.6 percent, an increase of 22.8 percentage points. However, in lower-income deciles, 
since people have a much larger marginal utility loss from general consumption if they 
cut their current-period consumption to pay for insurance premiums, the utility los
them is more difficult to be compensated by the expected marginal utility gain of staying 
in a good-quality nursing home. Consequently, subsidized LTCI premiums has a much 
smaller impact on them. For the lowest income decile, simulated LTCI coverage bar
moves. In aggregate, the simulated LTCI coverage increases from 6.8 percentage points 
to 17.7 percentage points, an increase of 10.9 percentage points, or 160 percent. Figure 
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15 shows the effect for individuals whose total wealth falls in the third total wealth 
quintile. The housing effect becomes more significant. Simulation results show that 70
percent of older individuals who have little housing wealth purchase LTCI. The dem
for LTCI by individuals who own expensive houses also increases, from 2.7 percentage
points to 10.9 percentage points. The effect is relatively small, because some of them sti
use their houses to self-insure.  
Although simulated LTCI coverage rates increase substantially when the government 
subsidizes the insurance premium, the saving in Medicaid expenditure is less than the 
subsidy cost. A 20 percent premium subsidy on average costs $1,351 for each individual 
in expected present value terms29, yet reduces the expected present value of Medicaid 
expenditure by only $302, from $10,720 to $10,418. In other words, each dollar spent on 
an LTCI subsidy only saves 22.4 cents of Medicaid spending. The result is not surprising. 
However, those people who have high income and high wealth are unlikely to claim 
Medicaid. Therefore, government spending increases due to the response from undesired 
wealth distribution. The result is lower than previous reduced form estimates. Goda (2009) 
estimated the effect of a LTCI premium tax subsidy by exploiting state level variation in 
 
and 
 
ll 
The increased in coverage is concentrated at the higher end of the wealth distribution. 
the generosity of subsidies. She concluded that each dollar of state tax expenditure would 
 
I 
produce approximately 84 cents in Medicaid savings. The difference could come from
various reasons. First of all, the subsidy is more generous in this model.30 As new LTC
                                                            
29 All present values are calculated using risk-free interest rate, discounted back to the period of entering 
the model. 
30 The average state tax subsidy is less than 5 percent.  
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holders are not poor individuals who mostly rely on Medicaid, more subsidies result in
higher losses. Secondly, the Goda model assumes all individuals purchase a LTCI contact 
that covers $100 per day for a period of four years, while this model assumes a 
comprehensive LTCI policy which covers $200 per day for an unlimited period of time. 
Therefore, the subsidy cost for the same level increase of LTCI coverage would be m
higher in this model.  
This chapter then examines an alternative 20 percent subsidy, targeted at individuals in 
the bottom three income deciles who are potential Medicaid claimants. Figure 16 shows 
the LTCI market responses. As expected, LTCI coverage rates in the bottom three 
income deciles increase while the behavior of the remainder of the population is 
unchanged. The simulated population LTCI coverage increases from 6.8 percentage 
points to 8.4 percentage points, an increase of a mere 1.6 percentage point. The simulated 
per capita expected present value of Medicaid expenditure decreases by $91, from 
$10,720 to $10,629, and the cost of the premium subsidy is $127 per person, showing a 
larger benefit-cost ratio of the program (0.716 vs. 0.224). Therefore, a targeted subsidy 
will be more cost-benefit efficient, but it does not have a sizable effect on LTCI coverage. 
 
uch 
 
 
ss than 
1 percent of total Medicaid nursing home expenses in most states, and the overall 
ood and Klem, 2007). Therefore, it is not 
1.5.2 Fully Functional Estate Recovery Programs 
Current ERPs do not recover many assets in most states. The recovery amount is le
na covery rate is only 0.61 percent (Wtional re
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surprising that ERPs do not have any significant effect on LTCI decisions. In this
subsection, I propose fully functioning ERPs, which would allow the government to 
recover Medicaid expenditures from the housing assets of all Medicaid recipients who 
have positive housing wealth. Performing this experiment uncovers the precise reas
why ERPs do not stimulate private LTCI market. It could be because the program is 
poorly enacted, that people do not take it very seriously, or that ERPs are not designed to
effectively stimulate the LTCI market. 
 
on 
 
he difference to the model is that all positive housing wealth at the time of death of 
aid recipients
low-quality nursing homes. The remaining housing wealth, together with the $2,000 in 
d job 
 
 
 affected by ERPs is how much recipients can 
 
T
Medic  would be used to first pay for the Medicaid benefits they received in 
financial assets allowed by Medicaid, would be left as bequests. The experiment keeps all 
other assumptions unchanged. Simulations show that the program does a fairly goo
of recovering Medicaid expenditures. On average, the present value of the recovered 
amount is $3,197, which is about 31.3 percent of the present value of Medicaid 
expenditures. But it has very little effect on LTCI coverage. Simulated overall LTCI 
coverage increases from 6.8 percentage points to 7.0 percentage points, an increase of 3
percent. To explain why, consider what would be affected by the policy. ERPs do not 
affect the eligibility of Medicaid as long as patients have less than $2,000 in financial
wealth and $30 per month in income. They recover Medicaid expenses after patients die. 
Therefore, the only factor that would be
leave for their heirs. Then consider who will be affected. Individuals who do not have
houses are apparently not affected by ERPs. Individuals who have houses could be 
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categorized into four groups based on their behavior at the time of entering nursing 
homes. The first group is people who stay in high-quality nursing homes and pay for care 
through LTCI. Adding ERPs will not reduce the value placed on purchasing LTCI. 
Individuals who purchased LTCI pre-ERPs will still do so post-ERPs. The second gro
is people who live in high-quality nursing homes and pay the cost out-of-pocket.
individuals in this group, housing wealth is treated as available resources to pay for th
nursing home cost as financial wealth  So they will not pay under Medicaid unless they 
exhaust both financial wealth and housing wealth. ERPs have no effect on them and th
behaviors will be the same with or without ERPs. The third group will be individuals 
whose total wealth cannot meet the financial wealth requirements of good-quality nursing 
homes. In this group, individuals usually have little housing wealth. Therefore, paying 
high insurance premiums to protect their inexpensive houses is not very appealing, 
especially given a modest bequest motive. Finally, there are individuals who can me
total wealth requirement but choose to enter low-quality nursing homes in order to le
more of a bequest. ERPs have the largest effect on this group. However, very few 
individuals belong to this group both in reality and in the model. Simulation shows t
only 0.98 percent of households would go to low-quality nursing homes in order to leave 
a higher bequest for their heirs. Therefore, when combining all five cases, I find that 
ERPs have very little impact on LTCI coverage. 
 
1.6 Conclusions 
up 
 For 
e 
eir 
et the 
ave 
hat 
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Using HRS data, this chapter builds a structural model to investigate the lack of demand 
for LTCI from a new angle: individuals’ preference for higher quality nursing home car
The estimated nursing home care quality preference parameter, which captures the u
loss suffered by an individual who seeks care at a low-quality nursing home, is modest, 
contributing to crowd-out of LTCI by Medicaid. This chapter also shows that housing 
wealth acts as self-insurance against the cost of nursing home care. If housing weal
were unavailable to pay for care, the simulated LTCI coverage would increase by 85.3 
percent. Finally, this chapter does counterfactual experiments to examine potential public 
policies that could stimulate the private LTCI market and reduce Medicaid expenditur
Simulations indicate that a 20 percent subsidy on 
e. 
tility 
th 
es. 
LTCI premium would substantially 
ulate LTCI coverage. However, each dollar spent on the subsidy saves only 22.3 
cents of Medicaid expenses. On the other hand, although effective enforcement of ERPs 
dicaid expenditures by about 31.3 percent, it would not substantially 
stim
would reduce Me
increase coverage. 
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Figure 5(a): Numerical Example for Two-Period Model (q=-0.1 & b=1)
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Figure 6: LTCI Coverage by Income Decile
Notes: LTCI coverage is calculated using the sample of 11,944 single females, weighted by person-level 
analysis weights. An individual is classified as holding LTCI if he or she has an active policy covering the 
ost of nursing home care. 
 
otes: LTCI coverage is calculated using the sample of 11,944 single females, weighted by person-level 
analysis weights. An individual is classified as holding LTCI if he or she has an active policy covering the 
cost of nursing home care. 
c
 
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
LT
C
I C
ov
er
ag
e
Financial Wealth Decile
Figure 7: LTCI Coverage by Financial Wealth Decile
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Figure 8: LTCI Coverage by Ratio of Housing Wealth to Total Wealth
Individuals in the Third Total Wealth Quintile
 
Notes: LTCI coverage is calculated using the sample of 11,944 single females, weighted by person-level 
analysis weights. An individual is classified as holding LTCI if he or she has an active policy covering the 
cost of nursing home care.  
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Figure 9: LTCI Coverage by Income Decile
Data Moments vs. Simulated Moments
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Figure 10: LTCI Coverage by Financial Wealth Decile
Data Moments vs. Simulated Moments
Data Moments
Simulated Moments
 
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
20-30% 30-40% 40-50% 50-60% 60-70% 70-80% 80-90% 90-100%
LT
C
I C
ov
er
ag
e
Ratio of Housing Wealth to Total Wealth
Figure 11: LTCI Coverage by Ratio of Housing Wealth to Total Wealth
Individuals in the Third Total Wealth Quintile
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Figure 12: LTCI Coverage by Income Decile
Experiment Moments vs. Baseline Simulated Moments
Baseline
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Figure 13: LTCI Coverage by Ratio of Housing Wealth to Total Wealth
Individuals in the Third Total Wealth Quintile
Experiment Moments vs. Baseline Simulated Moments
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Figure 14: LTCI Coverage by Income Decile
Experiment Moments vs. Baseline Simulated Moments
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Figure 15: LTCI Coverage by Ratio of Housing Wealth to Total Wealth
Individuals in the Third Total Wealth Quintile
Subsidy Experiment Moments vs. Baseline Simulated Moments
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Figure 16: LTCI Coverage by Income Decile
Experiment Moments vs. Baseline Simulated Moments
Baseline
Experiment
 
 
Moments Data Simulation Data Simulation
Probability of ever using nursing homes 44.0% 40.1% 27.0% 27.2%
Average age of first-time use nursing homes (Conditional on users) 84.0 84.0 83.0 82.9
Average years in nursing homes (Conditional on users) 2.0 1.9 1.3 1.4
Probability of using care for more than 1 year (Conditional on users) 42.0% 46.2% 33.0% 30.2%
Life expectancy at age 65 20.1 20.6 16.6 16.5
Life expectancy at age 75 13.1 12.7 10.7 10.5
Life expectancy at age 85 7.5 7.9 5.9 6.8
Life expectancy at age 95 3.6 4.3 2.7 3.9
Table 1: Estimated Statistics of Health Transitions
Female Male
Note: Nursing home utilization data are from Brown and Finkelstein (2008). Life expectancies are the 
author’s calculation based on the SSA life table for women and men who were born in 1935. 
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 Notes: Author’s calculation using the HRS. 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Long-term care insurance 9.83% 29.77% 7.62% 26.53%
Age 79.05 7.28 77.71 7.64
Financial assets 89822.31 165073.70 120210.80 218760.40
Housing wealth 86342.56 103401.40 90772.31 113737.10
Ratio of housing wealth to total wealth 46.50% 39.06% 42.52% 37.92%
Household income 22463.58 17289.45 30883.92 24523.95
Children 86.38% 34.30% 79.98% 40.02%
Observation
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Female Male
11944 3744
 
Parameters Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Intercept -0.1121* 0.0066 -0.1218* 0.0151 -0.0763 0.1044
Coefficient on income (000) -0.0015 0.0474 -0.0015 0.0514 -0.0012 0.1838
Coefficient on age -0.0106* 0.0034 -0.0107 0.0117 -0.0390* 0.0169
Coefficient on age square 0.0004 0.0035 0.0003 0.0171 -0.0001 0.1853
Calibration
β - Time discount factor
γ - CRRA coefficient
b - Bequest motive coefficient
Rf - Risk-free rate
1
1.03
1
0.97
2
0
1.03
Maleb=0
0.97
2
1.03
Table 3: Estimated Preference Parameters
Baseline
0.97
2
Notes: * Indicates the coefficient is significant at 5% level. 
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Chapter 2  
The Impact of House Price Movements on Non-durable Goods 
Consumption of Older Households 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, homeowners experienced over 50 percent windfall gains in 
real home values on average31. Regional variation is also considerable. Real house prices 
doubled, even tripled during the time period in some large metropolitans, such as San 
A. There are also places that real house prices barely moved, such as 
Rochester, NY. The housing market then experienced a deeply downturn starting from 
2007. Similarly, although house prices in some regions held well, houses in some other 
cities could have lost more than one third of their values. Given the risky feature of 
housing wealth, an interesting question to ask is whether households adjust their 
consumption as economic theory predicted when house prices fluctuate. There are 
substantial literature have examined the relationship. However, none of them focused on 
older households who could be the largest beneficiaries or victims of house price 
fluctuations.  
his chapter fills this blank by examining the impact of house price movements on non-
durable goods consumption of older households. It constructs an up-to-date panel dataset 
from 2001 to 200732 that focuses on older homeowners by linking the Consumption and 
                                                           
Francisco, C
T
 
31 Numbers are based on national house price index reported by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO). See data section for more information. 
32 Since the 2008 wave of HRS is not yet available, the last wave of CAMS is only used for the preliminary 
estimation of asymmetric behavior when house prices decline. 
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Activities Mail Survey (CAMS) and associated waves of the Health and Retirement 
oods 
onsumption when house prices appreciate. Economic theory states there are two possible 
 lead older households to increase their consumption in a booming 
housing market. It could because they are wealthier or the increase relaxes their 
borrowing constraint. This chapter tries to identify the reasons by comparing behaviors 
between non-credit constrained households and credit constrained households. Results 
show that both groups of households increase consumption when their house values 
appreciate and credit constrained households respond more strongly. So it is reasonable 
to conclude that both reasons would drive consumption of older households higher. In 
addition, permanent income theory predicts only unexpected house price movements will 
affect consumption of non-credit constrained households. This chapter provides empirical 
evidence the theory holds for older households. Expected house price movements have 
no significant effect on consumption of them. When house values increase, households 
could have several methods by which they can finance desired additional consumption, 
including cutting the rate of accumulation of financial assets, borrowing against the 
additional housing equity and increasing their other forms of debt, such as credit card 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized in the following orders. Section 2 briefly 
Study (HRS). Estimations indicate that older households increase their non-durable g
c
reasons that could
debt. This chapter shows that most additional consumption is financed through mortgage
borrowing.  
introduces background of housing wealth of older households and summarizes previous 
literature. Section 3 first builds a life-cycle model to explain possible responds of older 
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households from economic theory and then specifies econometric models used in this
chapter. Section 4 describes the dataset. Section 5 interprets estimation results. The last 
section concludes. 
 
2.2 Background  
Households’ responses from house price movements are not as straightforward as 
financial wealth. This comes from the unique characteristics of housing wealth. It is n
only a financial asset, but also consumption good. Thus, for an infinitely lived household
who has a constant demand for housing services, the value of its house is simply the 
expected present value of future flow of imputed rent (Sinai and Souleles, 2005). As 
shown in equation 1, 
௦ି௧ஶ
Where ܴ௦ stands for imputed rent at period s. β is the time discount factor. Higher house
prices merely imply higher present values for the future flow of housing services. 
Therefore, there is no wealth effect for the household when house prices fluctuate. The
consumption of this older household should not respond to fluctuations in house prices. 
However, fo
 
ot 
 
ܪ௧ ൌ ܧ௧ ∑ ߚ௦ୀ௧ ܴ௦      (1) 
 
 
r a real world household who has a finite life, the value of its house will be 
the summation of the expected present value of the future flow of housing services and a 
residual value. So the value of the house could be rewritten as equation 1’, 
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ܪ௧ ൌ ܧ௧ ∑ ܵ௦ߚ௦ି௧்௦ୀ௧ ܴ௦ ൅ ∑ ሺܵ௦ିଵ െ ܵ௦ሻߚ௦ି௧்௦ୀ௧ ܪ௦      (1’) 
Where ܵ௦ indicates the probability that the representative household is alive at period t.
The second part of (1’) is the present value of housing wealth residuals after death of the
household. This par
 
 
t could generate wealth effect for the household in reality, especially 
e the residual through taking a reverse 
mortgage. 
The unique characteristic together with the risky feature of housing wealth lead to the 
antial 
 
rices had a significant effect on aggregate consumer spending.  
There are also a small number of papers use micro datasets to study household level 
udo-
 
regional, 
house price changes affected predicted household consumption.  
for an older household who could consum
question how people responded to fluctuations of their home values. There is subst
literature on this topic. Most studies take a look at aggregate data. Although Elliot (1980)
concluded that real house price gains did not affect household consumption, later studies, 
such as Bhatia (1987), Benjamin, Chinloy and Jud (2004), Case, Quigley and Shiller 
(2005), Carroll, Otsuka and Slacalek (2006) and Skinner (1989) found evidence that 
movements in house p
responses to house price fluctuations. For example, Campbell and Cocco (2007) used the 
United Kingdom Family Expenditure Survey (FES) to create a household level pse
panel dataset by age, region, and home-ownership status and concluded that house price
appreciation stimulated households’ general consumption. They estimated the largest 
effect for older homeowners and none effect for younger renters. They also stressed the 
issue that regional house prices affected regional household consumption using their 
pseudo-panel dataset. Moreover, they found that predicted national, but not 
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Bostic, et al (2005) compared the effects of changes in housing and financial wealth on 
household consumption from a matched micro dataset from Survey of Consumer Finance 
(SCF) and Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) covering the period 1989 to 2001. They 
estimated the elasticity of consumption to housing wealth at 0.06 which is greater
the estimate
 than 
d elasticity of financial wealth 0.02, indicating that households responded 
more strongly to changes in housing than changes in financial wealth. They also found 
that the responses of credit constrained households responded differed from the 
unconstrained. 
5. 
 the 
ed 
that active but not total saving was affected by house price fluctuations. In addition, he 
found that people responded differently to capital gains and losses. Specifically, 
households cut consumption when they experienced real capital losses but did not 
correspondingly increase consumption when they had real capital gains. 
s 
nt 
Engelhardt (1996) used household asset and debt data from the 1984 and 1989 waves of 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to form a sample of homeowners under 6
He estimated the effect of house price movements on both overall and active savings,
latter is defined as the excess of current income over current consumption, and conclud
Munnell and Soto (2008) investigated the impact of the recent housing boom on 
household balance sheets using SCF in 2004.  They found evidence that households tap 
their home equity for consumption when house prices increased. Therefore, household
were left with higher debt and no additional asset. They concluded that about 30 perce
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of older households are worse prepared for retirement after the housing market boom in 
early 2000s. 
households. Housing wealth of older households deserves attention for three reasons. 
First, most households own their home with little or none mortgage by the time of 
retirement. Figure 1 shows homeownership rates of older households by birth cohort and 
age based on data from the HRS. Over 70 percent of households at age 51 and above 
have their own hom
Although there are many studies have examined the impact, none focus on older 
es and the homeownership rate keeps growing until age 66. At age 66, 
 
lds. 
y the 
 
sheets except for the present value of Social Security benefit.  
the homeownership rate for most birth cohorts exceeds 80 percent. The rate only starts to
decline at very advance ages. This finding is consistent with other research. Coile and 
Milligan (2006) analysis of the HRS data found that 82 percent of households aged 
between 60 and 64 owned their home. Venti and Wise (2002) analyzed Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP) data and found that 90 percent of couples and 62 
percent of singles owned their home at retirement.  
Second, housing wealth accounts for a large portion in balance sheet of older househo
As figure 2 shows, the value of the primary residence consistently accounts for over one 
third of households’ non-Social Security wealth over the 16 years time covered b
HRS. Other researchers found similar conclusions. Munnell and Soto (2008) concluded 
from SCF data that housing wealth accounts for 21 percent of total household wealth for
a typical household at retirement. It is also the largest component in households’ balance 
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Third, since older households have shorter life span, fluctuations of house prices could 
affect them more significantly as the probability of experiencing large opposite returns 
e there is no time discount. In 
addition, it’s reasonable to project the age-65 household has a 20-year life expectance and 
 
es 
 
for them becomes smaller and the residual values of houses for older households are 
larger. The first reason is easy to understand. Short-term returns of housing wealth could 
be quite different from returns in the long-run. The mean and standard deviation of real 
housing returns over the sample period 2001-2007, measured by the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) national house price index were 4.7 and 2.6 
percent respectively. However, over a longer period of 1975 to 2007, the average real 
return on housing, measured by the same index, was merely 1.6 percent with a higher 
standard deviation of 3.2 percent. Therefore, house prices have a higher chance to fall 
sometime in the future for younger households. For the second reason, it is easier to 
illustrate by an example. Assume an age-65 household and an age-30 household both 
own a $600,000 house with 0 mortgage balance. The rent is $10,000 per year if they live 
in the same house but do not own the house. Assum
age-30 household has a 50-year life expectance. Therefore, the present values of future 
imputed rent are $200,000 and $500,000 respectively. So the residual values which could
be consumed by households are $400,000 and $100,000 respectively. When house pric
double, future imputed rent and the consumable residuals will double simultaneously. 
The additional consumable home equities are $400,000 and $100,000 for the age-65 and 
the age-30 households respectively.  
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2.3 Model 
2.3.1 A lifecycle model 
This section builds a simple lifecycle model to illustrate possible effects of house price 
movements. Since the focus is on the responses of older homeowners, all households are
assumed to own their homes at the beginning of the model. In addition, they do not sell
their homes and move to rented accommodation, according with the well-documented
preference of most households to “age in place” (Venti and Wise, 2004). Households 
could consume home equity by borrowing against it. Instead of employing a forward 
mortgage and imposing borrowing constraint to the model, this chapter introduces a ne
mechanism called reverse mortgage which is designed for older households and perfectly 
suits for the needs of this chapter. Reverse mortgage is a financial product that allows 
households 62 and above to borrow and consume their home equity without selling the 
house. The amount of the reverse mortgage which is approximating to the present v
of the eventual sale proceeds depends on three factors, house value, age of the individual, 
and the interest rate at period t. It is larger if the house value is larger, the interest rate is
lower, or the household uses this financial product at an advance age. For simplicity, this 
chapter assumes the amount depends only on the house value when making use of this 
product. 
The representative homeowner maximizes its expected discounted lifetime utility, as 
shown in equation 2.  
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w 
alue 
 
ܧ௧ ∑ ߚ௦ି௧ܵ௦ܷሺܥ௦, ݄௦ሻ்௦ୀ௧       (2) 
This chapter assumes the household does not have a bequest motive. In addition, the 
m for simplicity. General consumption ܥ௦ and housing 
consumption ݄௦ are separately added to household’s utility. ߮ is the relative weight that 
  
 
ܧ௧ ∑ ߚ ܵ௦ logሺܥ௦ሻ௦ୀ௧        (2’) 
e 
ܴ ൌ ௙ܴ ൌ ܴ௛ ൌ
utility function takes log for
the household puts on housing consumption, as shown below,
ܷሺܥ௧, ܪ௧ሻ ൌ ݈݋݃ሺܥ௧ሻ ൅ ߮ logሺ݄௧ሻ 
However, since older households demand the same amount of housing services every 
period, housing consumption is always a constant. This makes the second term in the 
utility function a constant term and can therefore be dropped. Thus, the representative
household will maximize equation 2’ in the model, 
௦ି௧்
For simplicity, this chapter further assumes the house price growth rate equals to risk-fre
rate on financial assets, which is the reciprocal of the rate of time preference, 
1
ߚ
 
ܣ௧ ൅ ܥ௧ ൌ ܣ௧ିଵ ௙ܴ ൅ ௧ܻ ൅ ܼ௧ ൅ ݉ܽݔ൫0, ܴܯ௧ሺܪ௧ሻ െ ܮ௧ିଵ ௙ܴ൯    (3) 
ܣ ൐ 0     ሺ4ሻ 
ouse. It grows at constant rate ܴ௛ with unpredicted shock ߝ௧, which 
follows normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation ߪ௦.  
The household is subject to a no-borrowing budget constraint:  
௧
ܪ௧ is the value of the h
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ܪ௧ ൌ ܪ௧ିଵܴ௛ ൅ ߝ௧     (5) 
income of the household in each period, such as Social Secu sion income, 
which is assumed to be a constant. ܼ  is income shocks such as 
In the above model, ܣ௧ is financial wealth. It earns risk-free return of ௙ܴ each period. ௧ܻ  is 
rity and pen
௧ inherences. ܴܯ௧ is the 
reverse mortgage could be taken by older households. It solely depends on the house 
value as assumption. ܮ௧ is the balance of reverse mortgage. When house prices increase, 
the amount that household could take will exceed the accumulated balance. The 
household could therefore take the reverse mortgage again to consume the additional 
equity.  
Since the household cannot borrow, it is subject to the intertemporal budget constraint 
∑ ߚ௧ି௦ܥ௦ ൑ ܣ௧ ൅ ܴܯ௧ሺܪ௧ሻ ൅ ∑ ߚ௧ି௦ሺ ௦ܻ ൅ ܼ௦ሻ்௦ୀ௧்௦ୀ௧     (6) 
ܵ௧ܥ௧ ൌ ܧ௧ܥ௧ାଵ   (7) 
Solve it forward and combine with the intertemporal budget constraint,  
ܥ௧ ൌ ݂൫ܵ௧, … , ்ܵ, ܣ௧, ܧ௧ሺܪ௧ሻ, ܧ௧ሺ ௧ܻ, … , ்ܻ ሻ, ܧ௧ሺܼ௧, … , ்ܼሻ൯         (8) 
Specifically, 
ܥ௧כ ൌ
ଵ
ଵା∑ ఉೝష೟శభ ∏ ௌೞೝೞస೟
೅
ೝస೟
Therefore, first order conditions yield 
ቀܣ௧ ൅ ܧ௧൫ܴܯ௧ሺܪ௧ሻ൯ ൅ ܧ௧ሺ∑ ߚ௧ି௦ሺ ௧ܻ ൅ ܼ௧ሻ்௦ୀ௧ ሻቁ    (9) 
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Fro
nt riod are less than 
the optimal consumption level, i.e. ܥ௧ ൌ ܣ௧ ൅ ܴܯ௧ሺܪ௧ሻ ൅ ௧ܻ ൅ ܼ௧ ൏ ܥ௧
כ , they will be 
better-off since house price appreciation relaxes their borrowing constraint that ܴܯ௧ሺܪ௧ሻ 
n r 
the 
 
on, 
er, 
get constrained households may also consume more because of the wealth effect 
of house price increases when households experience an unexpected gain in housing 
wealth.  
One last issue worth mentioning is that the household may not respond to house prices 
ck in the amount of reverse mortgage when house 
prices are high. Since the reverse mortgage need not to be repaid as long as the household 
keeps living in the house, house price falls should not have wealth effect after purchasing 
 
al Model 
m (8), the effect of house price movements on consumption is ambiguous. For credit 
constrained households whose available financial resources at curre  pe
increases. For instance, for households who have shorter financial plan ing horizons o
households who expect a large inheritance ܼ௧ in the future, they could borrow against 
additional housing wealth if available and spend on current period consumption to 
achieve higher lifetime utility. For non-credit constrained households, housing wealth
affect households consumption decisions only through ܧ௧൫ܴܯ௧ሺܪ௧ሻ൯. An expected 
increase in house prices, or a temporary house prices change (Lettau and Ludvigs
2004), should not affect their consumption since ܧ௧൫ܴܯ௧ሺܪ௧ሻ൯ keeps constant. Howev
Non-bud
fall in this model because they could lo
a reverse mortgage. 
2.3.2 Empiric
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This chapter tries to determine whether the above theoretical model holds for older 
households using a new Micro panel dataset by linking the CAMS and corresponding 
lds. However, previous research sho
 (2001) 
s a 
jective estim
identifiers which are available to researchers on a restricted basis, MSA level house price 
indices are used to estimate the house price movements experienced by each eligible 
household in the dataset.  Then the effect could be identified by comparing the behavior 
of households living in areas that experienced rapid house price appreciation with that of 
The effects of house price changes on household consumption are estimated by the 
following model: 
waves of the HRS. Using Micro panel dataset has the advantage of capturing direct 
changes in consumption, house prices and wealth, as well as the unique demographic 
characteristics of particular househo wed that 
households often misreport values of their houses. For example, Venti and Wise
analyzed Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data and concluded 
households tend to over-value their homes by 10 percent. In addition, survey respondents 
usually include prices paid for improvement of their homes to their house values. A
result, employing self-reported house values to capture house price movements could 
suffer from large measurement error problem and the ob ation could be 
biased. This chapter therefore employs a novel technique to capture house price 
movements instead of using self-reported house values. Using the HRS geographic 
households living in areas where increases in prices were more modest. This eliminates 
reporting error that might otherwise bias the analysis. However, there is a weakness of 
this technique that it fails to capture household-specific house price movements.  
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∆ܥ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ∆ܪ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߚଷܼ௜௧ ൅ ߚ௥ݎ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ ሺ9) 
∆ܥ௜௧ is the change in log form of household total non-durable 
 
 
33, ܼ௜௧  
34  
ional 
 
als 
use 
redit 
ll 
 
The dependent variable 
goods consumption for household i between time t and t-1. ∆ܪ௜௧ is the change in log form
of house price between the two dates, measured by the OFHEO house price indices for
the MSA in which the household i lives, ௜ܺ௧ is a vector of socio-economic variables
is a vector of variables that measure local economic conditions , and ݎ௧ is the 10 year
Treasury constant maturity rate at time t, which is used to capture the effect of nat
financial conditions.  
Since durable goods yield a flow of services for a long period after purchasing, it is
difficult to convert the total expenditure to consumption each period. (Campbell and 
Cocco, 2007) This study therefore follows the consumption literature by examining 
expenditures on non-durables. It focuses in particular on three categories, food and me
away from home, clothes, and vacations. This chapter first estimates the effect of ho
price movements on the whole population. It then separates the sample into non-c
constrained and credit constrained households to examine whether the conclusion sti
holds. Third, this chapter considers the effect of expected and unexpected house price 
movements on non-credit constrained households. Fourth, it investigates where the 
funding come from if households decide to increase their consumption when house prices
                                                            
33 Demographic variables included in model are age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, and 
education of the head of a household. 
34 Variables that capture local economic conditions include MSA level unemployment rates and MSA level 
per capita income. 
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increase. Finally, it tests whether households behave asymmetrically when housing 
market slumps35. 
An obvious concern of the above estimations is endogeneity. Local economic condit
may affect both ho
ions 
use price appreciation and household consumption simultaneously. 
This chapter addresses the endogeneity in several ways. It first controls for local 
economic conditions using MSA level unemployment rates and per capita income 
s 
2.4 Data 
lly 
ny 
-
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Another specification uses change
in local unemployment rate and per capita income, and second lagged change in house 
price to instrument change in house price.   
 
2.4.1 Data sources 
This chapter uses data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a panel origina
comprising over 7,000 individuals born between 1931 and 1941 and their spouses of a
age, somewhat younger households being added in 1998 and 2004. The panel was re
interviewed every two years, the latest data being for 2006.  The dataset contains detailed 
information on households’ demographic information, family structure, financial and 
housing wealth, and mortgage debt.     
                                                            
35 Using tentative dataset. 
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In 2001, a sub-sample of 5,000 the HRS participants was randomly selected and mailed
questionnaires on consumption and activities.  The CAMS survey asked about recent 
expenditures on each of a wide variety of goods and services, including both non-du
goods and durable goods.  The same individuals were resurveyed in 2003, 2005, and 
2007.  
MSA level house price index, t
 
rable 
ogether with the national level house price index used in 
A 
d by 
007 
l 
while some other MSAs may experience 
eclines at the same time. Figure 3 (b) gives an example of the difference by 
comparing the house price movements in the two MSAs with the highest and lowest 
eturns during sample period respectively.   
cts a panel dataset from 2001 to 2007, a period encompassing a 
RS 
interviews immediately prior and subsequent to the CAMS survey to identify such 
this chapter, come from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). 
The house price index measures single-family house prices at both the national and MS
level, based on transactions data for conforming, conventional mortgages provide
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. National real house price movements from 1992 to 2
are shown in figure 3 (a), rebased to 1992. The return on housing also displays substantia
regional variation. House price gains in some Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) 
could be several times the national average, 
price d
housing r
This chapter constru
period of booming housing market, and the beginnings of the subsequent slump. It 
focuses on households that neither sold nor purchased a primary residence, nor 
experienced a change in composition during the sample period. It uses data from the H
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changes. As the latest published the HRS data is for 2006, the main estimations use the 
CAMS data for 2001, 2003, and 2005. It uses 2007 data for preliminary estimates of th
impact of house price declines.  
e 
d all three questionnaires, participated in the corresponding four HRS waves 
from 2000 to 2006 and also provided which MSA they are living. 542 of them, about 24 
between 2001 and 2005 are discarded, leaving a total of 1,298 observations. The unit of 
le as 
ple to 965 observations. 
, 
e 
 
2.4.2 Sample attrition  
Sample attrition is as follows. Of 2001, 3003, and 2005 CAMS respondents, 2,220 
answere
percent of total households, are discarded because they were not home-owners. Moving 
means households choose to switch allocations between general consumption and 
housing consumption. Consumption affected by moving is different from the effect of 
house price movements, and therefore households that bought or sold a primary residence 
observation in this chapter is a household. Divorce, remarriage or the death of a spouse 
affect consumption through changing family composition. So households whose 
composition changed in the sample period are eliminated and it reduces the sample to 
1201 observations. MSA level house price data is not available for the whole samp
some of them live in small towns that do not belong to any MSA. Eliminating households 
for whom house price data is not available reduces the sam
Missing consumption values were imputed using hot deck imputation. In a few cases
households with missing consumption data were discarded because they could not b
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matched with an appropriate donor household.36  Finally, the study discards the 
bottom 1 percent of observations whose consumption estimates were clearly 
unreasonable, leaving a final sample of 837 observations  
The first panel of Table 1 reports the means of three categories of non-durable goods 
consumption across all four waves of the CAMS for the final sample. The second and 
third panels of Table 1 shows the sam
top and 
e data for households in the ten MSAs that 
xperienced the largest ands smallest increases in house prices between 2001 and 2007. 
lly older households, their demand of 
consumption could become smaller when they age. The decline in consumption of 
Table 2 shows the panel regression results for four specifications. Column 1, 3, 5 and 7 
demographic variables. The estimated coefficient on the change in house price is 0.400, 
e
Since households in the HRS are genera
clothes and vacation over time reflects this age effect.  
 
2.5 Results 
report regression coefficients and the columns next to them report corresponding standard 
errors, clustered for the household and corrected for heteroskedasticity. The first panel 
reports the basic regression. The explanatory variables include changes in house price, 
household income, mortgage balance, 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate, and 
which is both economically and statistically significant, indicating when there is a 1 
                                                            
36 In common with other similar surveys, the HRS suffers from item non-response.  Eliminating households 
with missing data would bias the sample, and this study imputes missing data using hot-deck imputation – 
filling in missing data by making random draws from donor households with similar socio-economic 
characteristics. 
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percent increase in real house price, real non-durable goods consumption of older 
households increases 0.400 percent, keeping all other control variables constant. To 
illustrate, assume the average house price in the U.S is 200,000 dollars, and average non-
durable goods consumption is 10,000 dollars per year37. Then the estimated elasticity of 
0.400 implies that a 2,000 dollars increase in the house value will cause older
increase consumption by 40 dollars a year. Further assume
 households 
 the typical older household 
38
pbell and Cocco (2005) 
estimated 8.0 percent of additional house equity will be consumed. This could because 
e composition of consumption. This chapter considers only non-durable goods 
 and focuses more on the consumption on food, clothes and vacations. 
Therefore, it only considers part of the total consumption. Considering a wider range of 
consumption would result in a larger increase of consumption in dollars terms and a 
higher percent of total additional home equity. 
experienced the windfall housing wealth gain at 65. And the household takes out the 
additional housing equity immediately through a reverse mortgage. As a result, a 2,000 
dollars increase in house price gives the older household a housing wealth windfall gain 
of 1298 dollars . 40.0 dollars is about 3.1 percent of the total additional financial 
resource. This result is smaller than the results from previous researches. Horneff, Maurer, 
Mitchell and Dus (2006) found 7.2 percent is the optimal asset drawdown rate in order to 
maximize the lifetime utility of older households and Cam
th
consumption
                                                            
37 Based on Table 1, CAMS data. 
38 A 65 year old household could borrow about 64.9 percent of their total housing wealth under curren
interest rate base
t 
d on the rules, excluding closing cost. 
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An obvious concern is that local economic conditions may affect both house price 
appreciation and household consumption simultaneously. I therefore follow Campbell 
and Cocco (2007) and carefully control for local economic conditions using MSA lev
unemployment rates and per capita income obtained from the Bureau of Labor Stat
(BLS). The second specification included two more explanatory variables, the chang
MSA level unemployment rate and per capita income, to control for local economic 
conditions. The regression result is reported in the second panel of Table 2. The estimated
coefficients on both variables are insignificant, indicating that local economic conditions 
have little effect on changes in consumption of older households. In addition, the 
estimated elasticity on the change in house price is still significant and the magnitude 
increased slightly from 0.400 to 0.403. The small difference also shows that changes in 
real house price have some correlation with local economic conditions, but the effect is 
modest.  
A third regression controls for the endogeneity by using changes in local unemployment 
rate and per capita income, and second lagged change in house price to instrument 
change in house price. The result is reported in the third panel of Table 2. The newly 
estimated elasticity is 0.957 which is larger than before, indicating some endogeneity 
problems may exist in the first two panels. Panel four reports the regression result if I 
instrument change in household income and change in house price simultaneously. T
estimated elasticity of 0.837 is close to the previous estimation which instruments only 
el 
istics 
es in 
 
he 
change in house price. So a 1 percent increase in house price leads to a 0.837 increase in 
 non-durable goods consumption, keeping all other control variables constant. Using the
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same example to demonstrate the level effect, a 2000 dollars increase in real house pr
will lead to an 83.7 dollars increase in non-dura
ice 
ble goods consumption. This is about 6.4 
s 
error problems. Table 3 reports the results for the same four specifications but change in 
sible time span. Again, estimates of all four coefficients are positive and 
percent of the consumable housing wealth gain when the older household takes a reverse 
mortgage immediately after the house price appreciation.  
In summary, all the coefficients on the change in house price in the various specification
are positive and statistically significant, indicating a meaningful positive correlation 
between real house price movements and the change in real non-durable goods 
consumption. 
Another potential concern is that differencing consumption and wealth related variables 
between two dates may result in a very noisy measure of changes, given reporting error. 
Therefore, I run robustness check by differencing consumption, house prices, and 
household income over a longer time span from 2001 to 2005 to reduce measurement 
real consumption, change in house price and change in household income are between the 
longest pos
statistically significant with similar magnitudes, indicating positive correlations between 
changes in house price and consumption and confirming that the results from panel 
regressions are robust. 
From the previous economic theory section, credit constrained households will surely 
respond to real house price movements, while the responses of non-credit constrained 
households are unclear. Therefore, I separate the whole sample into two groups, credit 
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constrained and the non-credit constrained, to test the economic hypothesis. Since older 
households usually have low income and little or none mortgage debt, it may be 
misleading to categorize households on the basis of loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. Thus, I 
define as credit-constrained households that have very low levels of total financial asset. 
Since the number of observations is smaller in each subsample when separating the 
sample into two groups, measurement error problem could be enlarged in this case. 
Therefore, the variables employed in the estimations are differences between 2001 and 
ained households respectively. The later two panels are 
instrumented regressions in which changes in both real house prices and household 
 
on, 
2005. Table 4 reports the regression results. The first two panels are the regression results 
for the model that includes change in unemployment rates and per capita income as 
explanatory variables to control for local economic conditions, for credit constrained 
households and non-credit constr
income are instrumented by the changes in MSA level unemployment rates, MSA level 
per capita income and second lags of the two terms, again for credit constrained 
households and non-credit constrained households respectively. The coefficients on
change in real house prices are all statistically significant. In addition, as expected, the 
estimated elasticities on credit constrained households are much larger than non-credit 
constrained households. In the first specification, the estimated coefficients for credit 
constrained and non-credit constrained households are 2.192 and 0.376 respectively, 
indicating that the non-durable goods consumption of credit constrained households 
increase much more when the constraints are released. In the instrumental specificati
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the difference is even larger, 6.629 for credit constrained households and 0.510 for non
credit constrained households. 
only respond to unpredicted house price changes. However, Hoynes and McFadden 
(1994) found little evidence of this. I therefore perform some experiments to exam
whether the effects are significant. The models tested are as follows 
∆ ௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܧ∆ܪ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߚଷܼ௜௧ ൅ ߚ௥ݎ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧    (10) 
∆ ௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵሺ∆ܪ௜௧ െ ܧ∆ܪ௜௧ሻ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߚଷܼ௜௧ ൅ ߚ௥ݎ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧    (11) 
-
According to the permanent income theory, non-credit constrained households should 
ine 
If the permanent income hypothesis holds, households should not respond to expected 
house price increases and only respond to unpredicted house price movements. Two stage 
least squares regressions are used to perform these tests. The first step is to predict the 
change in real house price in period t. I adopt the methods used in Campbell and Cocco 
(2007), namely to use the second lag of changes in real house prices as an explanatory 
variable to predict the change in real house price in current period. The second lag 
variable in the first stage is statistically significant and the R squared from the regression 
is 0.49, indicating a relatively accurate prediction. After working out the predicted term, I 
calculate the unpredicted change in real house prices, the difference between the 
predicted and the actual change. The second step is to regress the change in real non-
durable goods consumption in current period on the predicated and unpredicted change in 
real house price respectively, controlling for income and other demographic variables. 
The results are reported in Table 5. The first panel and the second panel report the effect 
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of predicted and unpredicted house price movements respectively. Although the sign 
the coefficient on predicted house price change is positive, the magnitude is small and the
coefficient is not statistically significant, showing that non-credit constrained households
don’t respond to predicted hous
of 
 
 
e price fluctuations. The coefficient on the unpredicted 
n as their house 
values increase, an interesting question to ask is how they finance the add al 
consumption. This project considers two alternatives. First, I test whether they finance 
consumption by borrowing against home equity. Households could either refinance their 
g 
data 
take out 
house price change is 0.626 and statistically significant at the 10 percent level with p-
value 0.051. Therefore, non-credit constrained older households respond to only 
unexpected changes in house price, as the permanent income hypothesis predicts. 
When older households increase their non-durable goods consumptio
ition
mortgage, taking cash out, or they could take a second mortgage.  In either case, the 
mortgage balance becomes larger than before. Second, I examine whether they reduce 
their retirement saving when there is no increase in house prices, for example by drawin
down financial assets, or contributing less to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) or 
Defined Contribution (DC) accounts. Since the measurement of household saving rates 
using change in financial wealth is criticized by many economists, this project uses 
on contribution to IRAs, which is generally considered as one of the major forms of 
retirement saving, as a proxy for the household saving rate. The results are reported in 
Table 6. The dependent variable of the first two panels is whether the households 
more mortgages between 2001 and 2005. If the mortgage balance in 2005 is larger than 
2001, the variable takes the value one, zero otherwise. As perviously, the first panel uses 
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MSA level unemployment rate and per capita income as explanatory variables and the 
second panel considers an instrumental probit regression, using local economic variables 
and second lags as instruments. The estimated coefficient on the change in real house 
price is positive and statistically significant in both panels, indicating that when real 
house prices increase, households are more likely to increase their mortgage debt to 
finance current consumption. The third and fourth panels test whether households 
contribute less to their IRAs. The estimated results show a positive but statistically 
insignificant coefficient in both specifications. So there is no evidence that househ
responded to an increase in house prices by reducing their IRA contribution rate.  
olds 
e 
tion. It 
r 
 
 
real 
Engelhardt (1996) demonstrated that households could behave differently when peopl
experience house price gains and losses. This chapter takes this point as considera
constructs a dataset using 2005 and 2007 wave of the CAMS, which captures the 
beginning of the recent decline in house prices, to investigate if older households behave 
asymmetrically when house prices fall. Pending the release of the 2008 HRS, 2007 
household income is unknown. Household income is replaced by MSA level income pe
capita. Furthermore, I do not know whether households moved, changed their marital 
status, or entered a nursing home between 2006 and 2007, potentially biasing my results.
In addition, given that the goal in this section is to examine the response of households to
falls in house prices, I include only those who experienced a reduction in house value. 
Table 7 reports the regression results. The first specification only includes change in 
house price as explanatory variable, controlling for change in real income. The second 
one includes change in unemployment to capture the effect of local economic business 
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cycles. The third one instruments change in real house price with the second lag of 
changes in real house price and the unemployment rate. The fourth specification 
instruments changes in both real house prices and real income. None of the estimated 
elasticities are statistically significant. Therefore, there is no evidence that consumption 
of older households respond to reductions in house values. However, this could reflect 
deficiencies in the data, or because households haven’t paid any attention to the situa
yet, since 2007 is merely the beginning of slumping in house price. Extensions will b
done when more data is available. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
tion 
e 
 same 
 non-
 
By linking the CAMS and the HRS data, I construct an up-to-date panel dataset to 
examine the impact of house price fluctuations on non-durable goods consumption of 
households approaching or in retirement.  I focus on homeowners who lived in the
house during the sample period and who did not experience precipitating shocks which 
could affect consumption. I find that fluctuations in house values significantly affect
durable goods for both credit constrained households and non-credit constrained 
households. The effect is much larger for credit constrained households as expected. 
Furthermore, I find that only unpredicted changes in house price affect the consumption 
of non-credit constrained households, which is consistent with economic theory 
predictions. Predicted changes in house prices have no effect. Third, I find that 
households usually borrow against housing equity to finance additional consumption after
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they experience a windfall gain in house prices.  However, the lower net worth could le
to higher risk of lowering older households’ life standards in the future. Finally, I 
conclude with tentative estimates that old households do not respond when house pr
fall. However, this result could be biased due to lack of data. This project will be 
extended when more data is available.  
 
ad 
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Figure 3 (a): Real National House Price Index
 
Note: Author’s calculation using the OFHEO national house price index. 
 
Note: Author’s calculation using the OFHEO MSA level house price index. 
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 Variable 2001 2003 2005 2007
Overall Sample
Food/Dineout 5814.57 7074.65 6329.32 5254.09
Clothes 1508.78 1289.21 990.75 761.37
Vacation 3042.63 2022.91 2006.63 1910.98
Total 10365.98 10386.77 9326.70 7926.44
10 Largest Gain MSAs
Food/Dineout 6305.99 7680.61 5814.92 6416.71
Clothes 1244.47 1860.23 1368.10 794.70
Vacation 2860.28 2750.55 2167.49 2334.83
Total 10410.74 12291.39 9350.51 9546.24
10 Smallest Gain MSAs
Food/Dineout 5779.13 6952.74 6568.42 5160.51
Clothes 1883.44 849.66 581.96 458.50
Vacation 4013.69 1863.78 1510.06 1443.07
Total 11676.25 9666.18 8660.44 7062.07
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Households Non-durable Goods Consumption
Note: Author’s calculation using the CAMS and the HRS. 
 
Coeff Std Coeff Std Coeff Std Coeff Std
0.400 ** 0.175 0.403 ** 0.196 0.957 *** 0.314 0.837 ** 0.386
0.008 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.082 0.157
-0.002 0.008 -0.002 0.008
0.005 0.034 -0.007 0.012
0.103 0.843 -0.002 0.007 -0.065 0.016
-0.059 *** 0.013 -0.056 ** 0.026 -0.066 *** 0.014 0.022 *** 0.029
0.017 0.032 0.017 0.032 0.032 0.027 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.026 0.089
-0.040 0.054 -0.040 0.054 -0.078 0.057 0.034 0.111
0.020 0.040 0.020 0.040 -0.024 0.041 -0.047 0.072
-0.027 0.083 -0.027 0.084 -0.046 0.066 0.048 0.062
-0.011 0.043 -0.011 0.043 0.020 0.042 -0.191 0.101
67 * 0.091 -0.047 * 0.117
-0.183 0.115 -0.181 0.115 -0.033 0.107 -1.038 1.010
Single Female
Panel II
Hispanic
Age Square
Less Than High School Educated
College Educated
Single Male
Change in Unemployment Rate
Age
Panel III
Table 2: Panel Regression
Change in Real Interest Rate
Change in Income
Change in Real House Price
Change in Per Capita Income
Panel I
Change in Mortgage Balance
Dependent Variable: Change in non-durable good consumption
Panel IV
-0.102 0.077 -0.103 0.079 -0.1Black
 
Note: * indicates significant at 10% level, ** is 5% and *** is 1%. 
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Note: * indicates significant at 10% level, ** is 5% and *** is 1%. 
 
dCoeff Std Coeff Std Coeff Std Coeff St
0.501 *** 0.147 0.498 *** 0.181 0.346 * 0.205 0.613 ** 0.287
-0.008 0.007 -0.008 0.007 -0.008 0.007 0.043 0.089
-0.009 0.009 -0.008 0.009 -0.008 0.010 -0.008 0.016
-0.008 0.047
-0.246 1.116
0.066 0.041 0.066 0.041 0.063 0.055 -0.148 * 0.090
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
-0.133 0.090 -0.133 0.090 -0.129 0.093 -0.059 0.106
-0.009 0.064 -0.008 0.064 0.003 0.067 0.009 0.121
-0.080 0.104 -0.081 0.105 -0.072 0.134 -0.128 0.177
0.042 0.066 0.042 0.066 0.043 0.073 -0.176 * 0.102
-0.364 ** 0.142 -0.362 ** 0.143 -0.377 * 0.197 -0.188 0.155
-0.043 0.168 -0.046 0.170 -0.047 0.162 -0.507 0.312
Black
Hispanic
Dependent Variable: Change in non-durable good consumption
Panel IV
Less Than High School Educated
College Educated
Single Male
Single Female
Change in Per Capita Income
Age
Age Square
Table 3: Difference Between Longest Time Span Regression
Change in Real House Price
Change in Income
Change in Mortgage Balance
Change in Unemployment Rate
Panel I Panel II Panel III
 
Coeff Std Coeff Std Coeff Std Coeff Std
2.192 ** 0.916 0.376 ** 0.188 6.629 *** 2.405 0.510 * 0.282
0.050 0.058 -0.010 0.007 0.758 0.879 0.024 0.089
-0.162 ** 0.065 -0.006 0.009 -0.405 * 0.227 -0.003 0.016
0.020 0.220 -0.043 0.049
13.135 * 7.282 -0.588 1.140
-0.169 0.405 0.057 0.041 0.264 2.072 -0.138 0.090
0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.014 0.001 0.001
-1.165 * 0.648 -0.113 0.092 -4.660 * 2.545 -0.052 0.100
-0.380 0.442 0.015 0.064 -2.191 1.469 0.041 0.120
-0.138 0.854 -0.158 0.107 -4.526 2.763 -0.219 0.173
-0.299 0.602 0.019 0.068 -2.193 ** 0.941 -0.178 * 0.103
-1.136 0.739 -0.313 ** 0.145 0.072 0.406 -0.165 0.156
-0.354 0.562 -0.002 0.205 0.051 1.193 -0.706 ** 0.335
Black
Hispanic
Less Than High School Educated
College Educated
Single Male
Single Female
Change in Per Capita Income
Age
Age Square
Change in Real House Price
Change in Income
Change in Mortgage Balance
Change in Unemployment Rate
Table 4: Credit Constrained Households vs. Non-credit Constrained Households Regression
Dependent Variable: Change in non-durable good consumption
Panel I Panel II Panel III Panel IV
Note: * indicates significant at 10% level, ** is 5% and *** is 1%. 
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ote: * indicates significant at 10% level, ** is 5% and *** is 1%. 
 
dCoeff Std Coeff St
0.022 0.249 0.626 * 0.321
-0.011 0.007 -0.010 0.007
-0.007 0.010 -0.006 0.010
-0.087 ** 0.044 -0.027 0.055
-0.257 1.354 -0.123 1.278
0.056 0.056 0.047 0.053
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.110 0.097 -0.109 0.097
0.025 0.068 0.015 0.068
-0.159 0.132 -0.147 0.130
0.014 0.080 0.020 0.079
-0.323 0.211 -0.304 0.212
014 0.200 0.031 0.207
Change in Real House Price
Change in Income
Change in Mortgage Balance
Change in Unemployment Rate
Table 5: Predicated vs Unperdicated Changes in Real House Price Regression
Dependent Variable: Change in non-durable good consumption
Panel I Panel II
College Educated
Single Male
Single Female
Black
Change in Per Capita Income
Age
Age Square
Less Than High School Educated
0.Hispanic
N
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 Note: * indicates significant at 10% level, ** is 5% and *** is 1%. 
 
 
Note: * indicates significant at 10% level, ** is 5% and *** is 1%. 
 
dCoeff Std Coeff Std Coeff Std Coeff St
1.736 *** 0.576 2.053 *** 0.757 0.129 0.373 -0.304 0.417
-0.007 0.020 -0.173 0.248 -0.014 0.014 0.076 0.123
10.532 *** 1.341 10.417 *** 1.532 0.035 * 0.018 0.020 0.027
0.065 0.150 -0.029 0.091
2.768 3.457 -5.062 ** 2.185
-0.037 0.143 -0.176 0.268 0.294 ** 0.118 0.269 * 0.152
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.002 *** 0.001 -0.002 * 0.001
0.044 0.244 0.118 0.308 -0.592 *** 0.173 -0.641 *** 0.183
0.368 ** 0.186 0.358 0.318 0.324 *** 0.124 0.238 0.166
-0.085 0.358 -0.068 0.487 -0.412 * 0.219 -0.415 * 0.250
-0.095 0.190 -0.167 0.279 -0.451 *** 0.134 -0.476 *** 0.148
0.332 0.275 0.232 0.362 -0.156 0.213 -0.158 0.226
-1.049 *** 0.397 -0.888 0.928 -0.284 0.358 -0.593 0.427
Age
Less Than High School Educated
Change in Real House Price
Change in Income
Change in Mortgage Balance
Change in Unemployment Rate
Hispanic
College Educated
Single Male
Single Female
Black
Table 6: Probit Regression
Panel I Panel II Panel III Panel IV
Age Square
Take Additional Mortgages Reduce IRA Contribution RateDependent Variable: 
Change in Per Capita Income
Coeff Std Coeff Std Coeff Std Coeff Std
-0.362 1.135 0.412 1.313 -1.839 2.057 -0.977 2.419
-2.070 2.355 -1.903 2.368 -1.281 2.566 -2.672 2.434
0.125 0.098
0.071 0.044 0.074 * 0.042 0.065 0.043 0.054 0.042
0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.004 0.121 -0.002 0.122 -0.008 0.117 0.022 0.117
-0.041 0.093 -0.061 0.090 -0.053 0.091 -0.032 0.091
0.088 0.182 0.076 0.184 0.153 0.166 0.188 0.162
-0.076 0.088 -0.085 0.090 -0.053 0.092 -0.075 0.091
0.243 0.368 0.242 0.366 0.213 ** 0.374 0.156 0.374
0.355 * 0.183 0.426 ** 0.191 0.355 0.173 0.357 ** 0.182
Change in Real House Price
Change in Unemployment Rate
Table 7: 2007 CAMS Regression
Dependent Variable: Change in non-durable good consumption
Panel I Panel II Panel III Panel IV
Change in Per Capita Income
Age
Age Square
Less Than High School Educated
Hispanic
College Educated
Single Male
Single Female
Black
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Chapter 3 
How Much Do Households Really Lose by Claiming Social 
Security at Age 62? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the United States, most aged workers receive retirement benefits from Social Security.  
Benefits are paid in the form of an inflation-protected annuity.  Individuals can claim 
benefits at any age from 62 to 70.  There is no requirement that benefits be claimed 
immediately on retirement, although the benefits of those who continue to work between 
ings test.  Those who postpone 
laiming until age 70 receive 76 percent more per month than those who claim at age 62.  
The increases are approximately actuarially fair and Sass et al (2007) show that the 
expected present value of benefits varies little with claiming age. 
But choosing a claiming age is not simply a matter of maximizing the expected present 
value of lifetime benefits.  Individuals who delay claiming also acquire additional 
longevity insurance.  They can be thought of as returning this month’s check to the Social 
Security Administration in return for additional annuity income.  Previous research 
(Mitchell et al 1999) has shown that annuities have a value very considerably in excess of 
their money’s worth, the expected present value, divided by the premium paid, because 
st the risk of outliving their 
ealth. 
62 and Full Retirement Age (FRA) are subject to an earn
c
they provide the purchaser with valuable insurance again
w
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Most individuals claim benefits at age 62 or soon thereafter (Muldoon and Kopcke, 2008).  
they 
alth to delay claiming after retirement, often for substantial 
eriods.  
Using numerical optimization techniques, we calculate the optimal ages at which 
We calculate Social Security Equivalent Income, the factor by which the Social Security 
benefits of a non-liquidity constrained retired household claiming at sub-optimal ages 
                                                           
We show that most households claim early as a matter of choice in the sense that 
have sufficient financial we
p
husbands and wives in various household types should claim benefits, taking account of 
the additional longevity insurance purchased as a result of delay.  We show that the 
optimal age at which single individuals and married men should claim benefits is 
between 67 and 70, four to seven years later than the current average claim age, a result 
that is robust to alternative assumptions regarding level of risk aversion, relative 
mortality risk, and rate of time preference.   
must be increased so that it is as well-off in expected utility terms as at the optimal 
combination of ages.39  In contrast to the money’s worth calculations of previous 
research, we show that households incur substantial losses as a result of early claiming.  
For example, assuming a coefficient of risk-aversion of five and a three percent real 
 
fits 
after they retire, using the formula applied to individuals who delay claiming.  But as Benitez-Silva and 
008) point out, the increase in benefit only takes effect from the date at which the individual 
attains his Full Retirement Age, so that an individual who first claims and then, for a period ending prior to 
his Full Retirement Age, earns an amount sufficient to eliminate his benefits, is worse off than an 
individual who simply delays claiming until he has ceased working. 
39 In all our analyses, we abstract from the labor supply decision.  Most individuals permanently leave the 
labor force well before the ages at which we calculate it is optimal to claim Social Security benefits.  
Working individuals who have not attained the Full Retirement Age are subject to the Social Security 
Earnings Test.  Their benefits are reduced or withdrawn, but they are compensated with increased bene
Heiland (2
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interest rate and rate of time preference, a single-earner married couple in which the 
husband is three years younger than the wife would require a 15.9 percent increase in th
benefits payable if they both claimed at age 62 to be as well off as at the optimal claim 
ages of 69
e 
 for the husband and 66 for the wife.     
eatures 
to 
efits 
ose 
The reductions and increases for retired workers are approximately actuarially fair in the 
y a 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines relevant f
of the Social Security program.  Section 3 discusses previous research on the Social 
Security claiming and annuitization decisions.  Section 4 presents our model of the 
claiming decision.  Section 5 presents our results and Section 6 concludes.    
 
3.2 The Social Security program 
Social Security provides three categories of retirement benefits, retired worker, spousal, 
and survivor benefit.  Individuals can claim retired worker benefits at any age from 62 
70.  The Full Retirement Age for those born between 1943 and 1954 is 66.  The ben
of individuals claiming before that age are actuarially reduced, by 25 percent for th
claiming at age 62.  The benefits of those claiming late are actuarially increased, by 32 
percent for those claiming at 70.   
sense that the expected present value (EPV) of Social Security benefits, discounted b
three percent real rate of interest and annual survival probabilities, varies little with the 
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age of claiming.40  But this misses the impact of the claiming age on Social Security 
survivor and spousal benefits. 
worker benefit, provided they have turned 62 and their spouse ha
Spouses of retired workers can claim a spousal benefit, if that exceeds their own retired 
s already claimed his 
arly 
.  The 
ing is delayed beyond the Full Retirement Age.  
an their husbands, and will therefore qualify 
for survivor benefits on their husband’s death.41  Survivor benefits can be claimed as 
t 
 to 
e 
able margin, but are usually considerably older than 66 
benefit. At the spouse’s Full Retirement Age, they are entitled to a benefit of one half of 
their husband’s Primary Insurance Amount, or PIA, (the benefit the husband could 
receive if he claims at his Full Retirement Age).  The benefits of spouses claiming e
are actuarially reduced, by as much as 30 percent for those claiming at age 62
spousal benefit does not increase if claim
Most wives have lower lifetime earnings th
early as age 60.  For women born between 1945 and 1956, this benefit equals 100 percen
of their husband’s benefit if he dies when she is 66 or older, subject to a floor of 82.5 
percent of his Primary Insurance Amount.  If her husband dies before she attains age 66, 
her benefit is subject to an actuarial reduction of as much as 28.5 percent, but is subject
a floor of 71.5 percent of her husband’s Primary Insurance Amount.  Most women outliv
their husbands, often by a consider
when their husband dies.  A husband who delays claiming from age 62 to 70 therefore 
                                                            
40 The Social Security Administration uses a three percent real interest rate when making their actuarial 
assumptions, although the yield on long-dated TIPS has been below three percent since 2002. 
41 Men are also eligible for survivor benefits if they exceed their own retired worker benefit.  But most 
survivor benefits are paid to women. 
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usually increases the annual amount of his widow’s survivor benefit by 60 percent.42  So, 
delay significantly increases the present value of the total of the retired worker and 
e.  
 
rker 
 
44
survivor benefits payable over his and his wife’s joint lifetime, even though it has only a 
small impact on the present value of the retired worker benefit payable during his lifetim
As the amount of the survivor benefit is based on the husband’s, not the wife’s claim age,
a married woman who delays claiming can expect to receive an increased retired wo
or spousal benefit not for her lifetime, but for the shorter period ending on her husband’s 
death.43  This reduces the advantage of delay and means that it is optimal for married
women to claim benefits at younger ages than otherwise identical single women.  But a 
spousal benefit can only be claimed once the husband has claimed his retired worker 
benefit.  Although early claiming of the retired worker benefit will often facilitate early 
claiming of the spousal benefit, thereby increasing its present value, it will also, for the 
reasons explained in the previous paragraph, reduce the value of the wife’s survivor 
benefit.     
                                                            
42 A surviving spouse claiming survivor benefit after her FRA would receive a benefit of 132 percent of her 
husband’s PIA, if he had delayed claiming until age 70.  In contrast, she would receive only 82.5 percent if 
43 Women are not required to claim survivor benefit immediately on their husband’s death.  Our programs 
does not increase after she has attained her Full Retirement Age, so this rule only affects the small minor
of women who are widowed before attaining that age.    
he had claimed at age 62. 
assume that women delay claiming until the optimal age.  But the amount of a woman’s survivor benefit 
ity 
44 We ignore three unusual, but allowable, strategies for claiming Social Security benefits that may allow 
some households to receive increased benefits but appear to be little-used, namely 1) claiming Social 
Security benefits at, say, age 62 and then reclaiming at, say, age 66 at a higher benefit level, as long as they 
pays back past benefits without interest, essentially taking an interest-free loan from the Social Security 
Administration, 2) claiming spousal benefit at the Full Retirement Age and switching to retired worker 
d 
 These 
ing.pdf. 
benefit at a later date, and 3) upon reaching the Full Retirement Age, claiming Social Security benefit, an
then suspending payment, thereby enabling the individual’s spouse to claim a spousal benefit. 
strategies are discussed on the Center for Retirement Research website at 
http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/uniqueclaim
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The option to delay claiming is also an option to purchase an annuity.45  To illustrate, a 
single individual with a PIA of $1,000 can claim a retired worker benefit of $750 a m
at age 62.  If he delays until age 63, his benefit increases to $800 a month.  He is in effect
buying an annuity of $50 a month ($800 minus $750) at a cost of $9,000 ($750 times 
onth 
 
 Soto (2005) calculate the combinations of claim ages that maximize the 
expected present value of Social Security benefits for married men born in 1948 and their 
spouses of various ages.  They assume population mortality and a three percent real 
twelve months, the year’s benefits foregone).  A single earner husband and wife who are 
both the same age and with the same PIA can claim retired worker and spousal benefit of 
$750 and $350 at age 62, a total of $1,100.  If they delay claiming until age 63, their 
Social Security benefits increase by a total of $75, to $800 and $375.  They are in effect 
buying a $75 a month joint life and two third survivor annuity (the increase in benefits) 
for a premium of $13,200 ($1,100 times twelve month, the year’s benefits foregone).   
 
3.3 Previous Research 
Munnell and
interest rate.  They show that the expected present value maximizing combination of ages 
                                                            
45 The terms are generally more favorable than those obtainable from commercial insurers, sometimes by 
substantial margins.  It is difficult to make comparisons because commercial annuities provide annuities 
with fixed survivor benefits whereas the increment to Social Security survivor benefit depends on the ages 
n 
s 
e 
 6.5 
r the Full Retirement Age. 
of both claim and spouse’s death.  To illustrate, assuming a husband’s PIA of $1,000, a single earner 
married couple that delays from age 62 to 63 gives up $750 plus $350, a total of $1,100, in return for a
additional benefits of $50 and $25.00, a total of $75.00, a yield of 6.8 percent.  As of 18 February 2009, a 
leading provider of inflation protected annuities quoted a yield of 5.4 percent for a joint life and two third
survivor annuity payable monthly in advance with no guarantees. At age 63, the corresponding yields ar
9.3 percent for the Social Security annuity, and 5.5 percent for the commercial annuity.  But at age 69, the 
rankings are reversed with the Social Security annuity yielding 4.6 percent and the commercial annuity
percent, reflecting the fact that the spousal benefit no longer increases afte
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depend on the age difference between husband and wife and the wife’s PIA as a 
percentage of the husband’s.      
benefit based on her own contributions can claim retired worker benefit as soon as she 
turns 62, regardless of whether her husband has claimed his retired worker benefit, this 
may not be a good strategy if her spousal benefit exceeds her retired worker benefit.  The 
age at which she claims her retired worker benefit determines the early claiming 
reduction that will apply to her spousal benefit, which becomes payable once her husband 
claims his retired worker benefit.  The additional retired worker benefit received may be 
insufficient to compensate for the reduction in the spousal benefit.  
Table 1 reproduces their key results.  Although a wife who is entitled to retired worker 
ore than 40 percent of that of her husband, the wife should claim at 
 at age 69, regardless of the age difference.  The intuition behind 
benefits.   
If the wife’s PIA is m
age 62 and the husband
this result is that once the woman reaches some moderate level of retired worker benefits, 
she maximizes the lifetime value of this component by claiming early because she 
receives these benefits over the relatively short lifetime of her husband.  But her husband 
claims benefits relatively late in order to maximize the value of his wife’s survivor 
If the wife’s PIA is zero, the wife cannot claim before her husband.  Both husband and 
wife claim at the same time, with the household equating the increment to the expected 
present value of the survivor benefit resulting from delay with the reduction in the value 
102 
 
of the spousal and retired worker benefit.  The wife claims later and the husband 
than when the wife’s PIA is more
earlier 
 substantial.    
in 
nd 
nefits 
 
ales, and therefore failed to capture the effects of both 
 
the expected utility maximizing age.  At a three percent interest rate, and assuming 
Sass et al (2007) extended the above analysis by calculating how much households lost 
money’s worth terms by claiming at sub-optimal combinations of ages.  Using Health a
Retirement Study (HRS) data, they calculated that the average loss resulting from both 
husband and wife claiming as soon as possible at 62, rather than delaying to the 
combination of ages that maximized the household’s expected present value of be
was just $14,135 (in 2006 dollars), four percent of the maximum value.  However, they 
found that these generally small losses in the present value of total household benefits hid
substantial survivor benefit losses. 
The above money’s worth calculations ignore the longevity insurance value of Social 
Security.  As we will show in Section 4, calculations that ignore the value of the 
longevity insurance provided by Social Security substantially understate both the optimal 
age and the cost of early claiming. 
The only previous paper that calculates optimal claim ages taking account of the 
longevity insurance provided by Social Security is Coile et al (2002).  But their paper 
only reported results for single m
longevity risk sharing within marriage, and the complex interactions between retired 
worker, spousal, and survivor benefits discussed in Section 1.  They compared the claim
age at which a single male would maximize the expected present value of benefits with 
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population mortality for the 1930 birth cohort, the expected present value of benefits is 
maximized at just 62 years and ten months.46  Assuming log utility the utility maximizing 
47
  
inants of 
sociated with somewhat later claiming, but find no 
ecurity benefits for an actuarially fair lump sum.  
p sum 
                                                           
age varies from 62 years and eleven months to 65 years, depending on the household’s 
wealth level.    
Coile et al (2002), Hurd et al (2004), and Sass et al (2007) analyze claiming behavior.48
A problem common to all these studies is that it is difficult to identify the determ
claiming behavior when the overwhelming majority of individuals claim as soon as they 
are eligible, or shortly thereafter.  Both Coile et al (2002), and Hurd et al (2004) find 
some evidence that subjective mortality beliefs have an effect.  Sass et al (2007) find that 
having college level education is as
evidence that the balance of financial decision-making power in the household 
contributes to early claiming. 
Brown et al (2007) analyze the self-reported willingness of HRS individuals aged 50 to 
64 to exchange half of their Social S
Those who chose the lump sum were then asked how they would choose if the lum
were reduced by 25 percent.  Those who chose full benefits were asked how they would 
 
birth cohort, making it optimal for men in that cohort to delay beyond age 62, even though they had higher 
 of 
 
higher degree of willingness to substitute intertemporally than is typically assumed in models of retirement 
 
ing 
from the retirement decision. 
46 The percentage return to delay from age 62 to 63 was substantially higher for the 1930 than for the 1946 
mortality rates than the 1946 cohort.  
47 Under constant relative risk aversion, the marginal value of annuitization depends on the proportion
wealth that is already annuitized.  Households with very little financial wealth are already highly annuitized
and therefore place relatively little value on further annuity purchases.  Log utility implies a considerably 
wealth decumulation.  The delayed retirement credit beyond the 1930 birth cohort Full Retirement Age of
65 was only three percent, making delay beyond that age unattractive even to those placing a high value on 
further annuitization. 
48 There are also models, for example, Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) that do not separate the claim
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choose if the lump sum were increased by 25 percent.  Most individuals preferred the 
lump sum, and 37 percent even preferred the reduced lump sum.  They found that health 
status had some effect on preferences, but that many of the factors that economic theory
predicts should h
 
ave an effect – risk aversion, gender, marital status, wealth, having a 
nt 
) 
individuals appear to have reasonable 
c 
f 
 
often, but not invariably be inconsistent with a high discount rate.   
 
pension plan, and children – had no statistically significant effect. 
Previous research has reached similar conclusions.  Warner and Pleeter (2001) analyzed 
how service personnel participating in a downsizing program chose between a lump sum 
and a lifetime pension.  The decisions of some individuals were consistent with discou
rates exceeding 17 percent, although in contrast to Brown et al, Warner and Pleeter (2001
found that decisions varied with education, race, gender, number of dependents, and 
cognitive ability. 
Hurd and McGarry (1995, 2002) showed that 
subjective mortality beliefs, so it seems unlikely that the above findings reflect systemati
biases in forecasting life expectancy. Although some households may have high rates o
time preference or be subject to binding liquidity constraints, most households entering 
retirement have accumulated non-trivial amounts of financial wealth, behavior that would
Another explanation for the prevalence of early claiming is proposed by Benitez-Silva et 
al (2007).  They show that a belief that there is even a small probability that the 
government will reduce Social Security benefits can result in households pre-empting the
government and claiming benefits at the earliest permissible age. 
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The low value placed on the Social Security annuity is another manifestation of 
individuals’ well-documented reluctance to annuitize.  Brown (2007) contains a review of
possible explanations, in addition to the ones discussed in the previous paragraphs.  
 
 
3.4 Modeling the Social Security Claiming Decision 
ܷ௠൫ܥ௧ , ܥ௧ ൯ ൌ
We follow previous research (Brown and Poterba, 2000, Dushi and Webb, 2004), and 
assume that couples have a utility function of the following form: 
௠ ௙ ቀ஼೟
೘ାఒ஼೟
೑ቁ
భషം
ଵିఊ
, ௙ܷ൫ܥ௧ , ܥ௧ ൯ ൌ
௙ ௠ ቀ஼೟
೑ାఒ஼೟
೘ቁ
భషം
ଵିఊ
                     (1) 
where λ measures the jointness of consumption, ܥ௧௠, ܥ௧
௙ denote the consumption of the 
t 
fficient to ensure that 
husband and wife at time t, and γ is the coefficient of risk aversion.  When λ equals one, 
all consumption is joint.  When λ equals zero, none of the household’s consumption is 
joint. We assume that λ equals 0.5. 
In our base case, we endow households with an amount of financial wealth at age 62 tha
is equal to the expected present value of the Social Security benefits they would receive if 
they both claimed at age 62.49  This amount of financial wealth is su
households have sufficient financial assets to fund consumption from age 62 to 70 of an 
amount equal to their benefits payable at age 70.  
                                                            
49 Using population mortality tables for the 1946 cohort.   
106 
 
Each period, the husband and wife each decide whether to claim Social Security 
and what percentage of unannuitized wealth to consume.50  The optimal choices are 
permitted to depend on financial wealth and whether both or only one of the spouses
benefits, 
 is 
 is solved using dynamic programming.51   
 ages, we then calculate Social 
Security Equivalent Income (SSEI), the factor by which the benefits payable at other 
 
ther combination.  By 
construction, SSEI equals one at the optimal combination of claim al 
combinations of claim ages, SSEI is greater than one.  A household claiming at a sub-
efits to
en, and married couples.  Our base case is a one-
                                                           
alive.  The problem
Having determined the optimal combination of claim
combinations of claim ages must be multiplied so that household is indifferent between
claiming at the optimal combination of ages, and claiming at that o
 ages.  At sub-optim
optimal age would require its Social Security ben  be multiplied by the factor 
shown in the relevant cell in the table to be indifferent between claiming at the sub-
optimal and the optimal ages.  
We consider single men, single wom
earner couple, both the same age, with population mortality for the 1946 birth cohort. 
Following previous research, we assume they have a three percent interest rate that also 
equals the rate of time preference.   
 
-used claiming strategies described in the 
ue: Unusual Strategies for Claiming Social 
Security Benefits.” http://crr.bc.edu/linked_in_content_pages/unique_claiming_strategies.html 
51 This involves calculating an optimal strategy in period T, assumed to be age 100, calculating the utility of 
that strategy, and working back to age 62, calculating the strategy in each preceding period under the 
assumption that the household adopts the optimal strategy from that period onwards.  The optimal strategy 
for each period is calculated for all feasible wealth values and all feasible Social Security retired worker, 
50 We assume that households do not adopt any of the seldom
Center for Retirement Research publication “Strange, but Tr
spousal, and survivor benefits.   
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On average, there is a three year age difference between husbands and wives in HRS 
households, and in view of the impact of age difference on the value of both spousal 
survivor benefits, we consider alternatives in which the wife is one to six years younger 
than the husband, and has population mortality for the 1947 to 1
and 
952 birth cohort, as 
52 ed 
percent by investing in risky equities.  But households are rarely at a corner solution 
nd 
eir 
t and which could be drawn down were the 
household to delay claiming Social Security.  So our assumed rate of interest biases our 
appropriate.  We also consider couples in which the wife is entitled to her own retir
worker benefit.  
Warner and Pleeter (2001) provide evidence that some households may have quite high 
rates of time preference, and we therefore consider alternative rates of time preference of 
five and ten percent.  We also consider alternatives in which the husband and wife have 
the average mortality rates of high and low mortality socio-economic groups.   
The current rate of interest on Treasury Inflation Protected Securities is considerably less 
than three percent.  Households can, of course, obtain a higher expected return than three 
where the size of their equity portfolio is constrained by their financial wealth.  Coile a
Milligan (2006) show that most retired households hold a considerable proportion of th
wealth in cash and short-term deposits where both anticipated and historic real returns 
have fallen well short of three percen
results against delay. 
                                                            
52 In these alternatives, we calculate the present value of age 62 benefits discounted back to when the 
husband is aged 62. 
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Our analysis ignores income tax.  Social Security benefits receive favorable tax treatm
and Mahaney and Carlson (2007) show that taxation magnifies the advantages of delayed
claiming of Social Security.
ent, 
 
ents of 
risk aversion of two and five.54  A single male maximizes the money’s worth of his 
would require a 1.2 percent increase in his benefits to be as well off as at the optimal 
53   
 
3.5 Results 
Table 2 reports SSEI for single men and women.  The first and fourth columns show 
SSEI where the utility of consumption is the dollar amount of that consumption, and the 
individual’s objective is simply to maximize the money’s worth of his Social Security 
benefits.  The remaining columns show SSEI assuming CRRA utility at coeffici
benefits if he claims at age 62. But he would only be slightly worse off claiming at other 
ages.  For example, if he delayed claiming until age 66, his Full Retirement Age, he 
claim age of 62.  In contrast, at a coefficient of risk aversion of five, the expected utility 
of benefits is maximized at age 69.  A single male claiming at age 62 would require a 
                                                            
income” is calculated.  This equals regular taxable income plus 50 percent of Social Security inco
income over the first threshold ($25,000 for singles and $32,000 for married couples), plus 35 percent of 
combined income over the second threshold ($34,000 for singles and $44,000 for married couples). 2) 50 
percent of benefits plus 85
benefits.  A household that
53 The taxation treatment of Social Security benefits is as follows.  First, the household’s “combined 
me.  The 
amount of Social Security income that is taxable is the minimum of three tests: 1) 50 percent of combined 
 percent of combined income over the second threshold. 3) 85 percent of 
 substitutes a dollar of regular income (for example, an IRA withdrawal) for a 
dollar of Social Security income reduces its combined income by 50 cents.  This will in turn reduce the 
amount of Social Security income that is taxable.  For example, if rule (3) applies, taxable Social Security 
income will decrease by 42.5 cents.  Adjusted Gross Income will decrease by $1.425, and a household in 
the 25 percent tax bracket will save just over $0.35 in federal taxes.  
54 These figure rest in the middle of the range reported in the literature, which tends to cluster between 2 
riments, or preferences over lotteries (Chetty 2003). 
and 10 depending in part on whether the estimates are derived from portfolio theory, purchases of 
insurance, economic expe
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15.8 percent increase in benefits to be as well off in expected utility terms as he would be 
were he to delay until age 69, reflecting the high value placed on the additional longevity 
insurance acquired as a result of delay.   
ingle women, maximize the money’s worth and expected utility of benefits at 67 and 70 
an claiming at age 62 would require only a 2.9 percent 
increase in benefits to be as well of as at the optimal age.  But at a coefficient of risk 
 69 
e 
y 
n 
 
S
respectively.  A single wom
aversion of five, the required increases in benefits 19.0 percent.   
The cost of early claiming is greater at higher degrees of risk-aversion, reflecting the 
greater value that the risk-averse place on the opportunity to acquire additional longevity 
insurance.  But the optimal age varies little with the individual’s degree of risk-aversion, 
and it is optimal for even relatively risk-tolerant individuals to delay claiming until after 
the Full Retirement Age. 
Figure 1 shows the optimal consumption paths for single men claiming at ages 62, 66,
(the expected utility maximizing age) and 70, assuming a PIA of $1,000, a coefficient of 
risk-aversion of five and an amount of unannuitized wealth that equals the present valu
of Social Security benefits if those benefits are claimed at age 62.  The initial monthl
consumption of a single man who claims at 62 is $1,390, made up of $750 Social 
Security benefits and $640 drawings from unannuitized wealth.  Total consumption 
declines with age.  By age 97, unannuitized wealth is totally exhausted, and consumptio
equals the $750 a month Social Security benefits. A man who claims at the expected 
utility maximizing age of 69 enjoys initial consumption at age 62 of $1,484, declining to
110 
 
$1,240 by age 88 when unannuitized wealth is exhausted. Importantly, the strategy of 
claiming at age 69 yields not only the highest consumption at all ages up to 80 but also 
very much higher consumption at older ages than the strategy of claiming at age 62.  
, assuming CRRA 
utility with coefficients of risk aversion of two and five respectively.  We do not report 
ing at 62 - 2.7 percent of age 66 pension wealth. When the 
nd 
Table 3 reports SSEI for the base case couple.  The first panel shows SSEI where the 
utility of consumption is simply the dollar amount of that consumption and the 
household’s objective is to maximize the money’s worth of benefits.  The second and 
third panels report Social Security Equivalent Income calculations
values for infeasible combinations of claim ages – those in which the wife’s claim age is 
less than that of her husband.   
The money’s worth of benefits is maximized when both husband and wife claim at 66.  
But they lose little by claim
coefficient of risk aversion equals two, it is optimal for both to claim at 67, and a husband 
and wife claiming at age 62 would require an 7.8 percent increase in benefits to be as 
well off in expected utility terms.   When the coefficient of risk aversion equals five, it is 
optimal for both to claim at 68, and the required increase in benefits 11.1 percent.  The 
combination of ages that maximizes the household’s expected utility is almost identical to 
that which maximizes money’s worth. But the money’s worth calculations understate the 
cost of early claiming by as much as 8.4 percentage points. 
Figure 2 shows the consumption path of a single earner couple in which the husband a
wife both claim at 62, 66, 68 (the optimal age) and 70, assuming a coefficient of risk-
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aversion of five and that they are both the same age.  If they both claim at age 62, their
initial monthly consumption is $2,131, made up of $1,100 Social Security benefits and 
$1,021 drawings from unannuitized wealth.  The couple never completely exhausts its
 
 
risk aversion of five, with the base case of a couple who 
wife’s survivor benefit because it increases the number of years she is expected to outlive 
wife should claim at the 
 
unannuitized wealth, although by age 100, total consumption has fallen by almost exactly 
half to $1,124. But if they claim at the optimal age of 68, their initial consumption at age 
62 is $2,232, decreasing to $1,660 by age 97, when financial wealth is exhausted.  A 
couple that delays until age 68 enjoys higher consumption in all periods than one that 
claims at age 62, and substantially higher consumption at advanced ages. 
Table 4 reports SSEI for cases in which the husband is one to six years older than the 
wife, assuming a coefficient of 
are both the same age shown for comparison.  We again do not report infeasible 
combinations of claim ages.  An increase in the age difference increases the value of the 
her husband.  But it conversely decreases the cost of delay by the husband in claiming his 
retired worker benefit because delay has less of an impact on the value of the wife’s 
spousal benefit.  If the husband is t years older that the wife, then delay by the husband 
from 62 to 62 + t can never result in any loss of spousal benefit. 
As the age difference increases it becomes optimal for the husband to claim at older ages, 
and for the wife to claim at younger ages.  The husband and 
same time if the age difference is four years or less.  If the age difference is greater than 
four years, the husband should delay until age 70, and the wife should claim at age 66,
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her Full Retirement Age.   As the age difference increases, so does the cost associated 
with claiming at age 62.  There is also an increase in the cost associated with the couple
claiming at age 62.  If the husband is three years older than the wife, the average for thi
birth cohort, SSEI equals 1.159 and the household would require a 15.9 percent increase 
in benefits to be as well off in expected utility terms claiming at age 62 as they would be 
were they to delay until the optimal ages.  
Table 5 reports SSEI for two earner households in which the wife’s PIA is 25 or 50 
percent of that of her husband, with the base case of a single earner couple again show
 
s 
n 
l 
al for her 
for comparison.  We consider a coefficient of risk aversion of five, and assume that 
husband and wife are the same age.   In the single-earner case, delay by the husband in 
claiming his retired worker benefit can prevent the wife from claiming her spousa
benefit.  But as explained in Section 2, if the wife is entitled to her own retired worker 
benefit, she can claim that benefit at any time after attaining age 62, switching to spousal 
benefit, if greater, when her husband claims his retired worker benefit.  
As the wife’s PIA increases relative to that of her husband, it becomes optimal for the 
husband to further delay claiming from 68 to 70.  It also becomes optimal for the wife to 
claim at younger ages.  When her PIA is 25 percent of her husband’s, it is optim
to claim at age 66, three years before her husband.  When it is 50 percent of her 
husband’s, it is optimal for her to claim at age 65, five years before her husband.  
Table 6 reports SSEI for less patient households and those whose mortality differs from 
the population average, again with our base case shown for comparison.  In each case, we 
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consider a single-earner couple in which the wife is the same age as her husband, and 
assume a coefficient of risk aversion of five.  
five percent rate of time preference in panel two and a ten percent rate in panel three.  At 
higher discount rates, the household places greater weight on consumption early in 
retirement, and it becomes optimal for the hus
We first consider impatient households with population average mortality, assuming a 
band to claim retired worker benefits at 
 it is 
mortality couple is one in which both husband and wife are white and have completed 
e 
younger ages.  But the effect is very small, reflecting the fact that even impatient 
households plan to consume an amount at least equal to their Social Security benefits 
until quite late in retirement.  Even at an extreme ten percent rate of time preference,
still optimal for the husband and wife to delay claiming until age 67. 
The remaining panels show Social Security Equivalent Income for couples in high and 
low mortality socio-economic groups, assuming a three percent discount rate.  Our low 
four or more years’ college.  Our high mortality couple is one in which both husband and 
wife are black, and have not completed high school.  We assume that these couples hav
the same proportion of unannuitized wealth as our base case couple.55  In reality, the 
average high mortality couple has much smaller proportions of pre-annuitized wealth and 
would encounter liquidity constraints in the event of delayed claiming.  But our 
calculations serve the broader objective of quantifying the effect on optimal claim ages of 
plausible variations in subjective mortality beliefs. 
                                                            
55 Under our assumption of constant relative risk aversion it is the proportion of wealth that is held in 
unannuitized form, rather than the absolute amount of that wealth, that determines the optimal claim age 
and SSEI. 
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We assume that both husband and wife are from the same socio-economic group, and t
they both have the average mortality rate for in
hat 
dividuals in that group.  We calculate 
rs 
56 n a 
completed high school.  There are insufficient Hispanics in the sample to permit 
 
group-specific mortality rates by multiplying male and female mortality rates for the 
1946 birth cohort by the relative mortality factors reported in Brown et al (2002).  The 
calculation of the factors is explained in detail in that paper. To summarize, the autho
estimated a nonlinear model for age-specific mortality for each group, using data from 
the National Longitudinal Mortality Survey (NLMS), a dataset covering the period 1979 
to 1989.   They report relative mortality rates for white men and women with less tha
high school education, high school or some college, and four years or more college. 
Blacks are categorized into two educational groups, depending on whether they 
categorization by education.  Up to age 87, the less well educated and minorities have 
higher mortality.57  But this relationship breaks down at older ages.58  In results that are 
not reported, we find that our results are not significantly affected if we assume that age
87 relative mortality rates continue to apply at older ages. 
We report SSEI for college-educated whites and blacks with less than a high school 
education.  Socio-economic differences in mortality rates have no effect on optimal 
                                                            
56 Brown (2002) contains a review of previous literature on socio-economic differences in mortal
As Brown et al (2002) point out, the NLMS dataset does not contain mortality data above age 84
relative mortality factors at age 85 and up therefore depend not only on the functional form of the mortality 
model, but also on possibly noisy measures of mortality rates at slightly younger ages.  The construction of 
mortality rates of these groups has and will remain constant, e
57 The exception is Hispanics who have lower mortality at younge
ity rates.  
.  The 
cohort mortality tables for socio-economic groups is based on the strong assumption that the relative 
ven as the relative sizes of the groups change. 
r ages.   The Hispanic data may reflect 
survivor bias at older ages.   
 
of three low mortality group. 
58 This might be a real phenomenon, or may reflect measurement error.  If there is an upper limit to life
expectancy, then there must be some age at which relative mortality rate of the high mortality group falls 
below that 
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claiming ages.  A black couple with less than a high school education should delay 
claiming until age 68, exactly the same age as a white college-educated couple.  Socia
Security equivalent income varies with socio-economic status, but not by large amoun
For the population as a whole, Social Security equivalent income equals 1.111 if the 
husband and wife both claim at 62, in other words, they would require a 11.1 percent 
increase in benefits to be as well of in expected utility terms claiming at age 62 as at the
optimal age.  The corresponding values are 1.098 for black couples with less than a high 
school education and 1.115 for while college educated couples. 
Figure 3 shows optimal consumption for the black couple.   As in the base case, claim
at the optimal age of 68 yields higher consumption at all ages than claiming at age 62.
Initial consumption at age 62 is three percent higher than in the base case  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
l 
ts.  
 
ing 
  
Some households have little choice but to both retire early and claim benefits 
ck 
om 
immediately on retirement.  They are forced out of the labor market by ill health or la
of job opportunities, and lack the liquid financial wealth to separate the retirement fr
the claiming decision. But many households have sufficient financial resources to delay 
claiming. We calculate that 40 percent of the married couples in the Health and 
Retirement Study who turned 62 between 1992 and 2006 had sufficient financial assets to 
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fund consumption from age 62 to 68 and 46 percent had sufficient to delay from 62 
66.59  
claiming Social Security benefits.  The fact that they choose not to is another 
manifestation of the so-called “annuity puzzle,” the well-documented reluctance of 
retired households to annuitize their financial wealth.  Delayed claiming would also 
likely be effective in reducing the relatively high poverty rate among elderly widows 
to 
Our results indicate that these households would be substantially better-off delaying 
because it would increase their Social Security survivor benefit, which is often their sole 
nd not viewing the two forms of wealth as fungible, or if they are framing delayed 
ble they will lose if they die young, rather than as the purchase of 
valuable longevity insurance, then the appropriate response may be financial education.60  
 their 
                                                           
or principal source of income. 
The optimal policy response may depend on why households appear reluctant to 
exchange financial for Social Security wealth.  If they are practicing mental accounting, 
a
claiming as a risky gam
If husbands are attaching insufficient weight to impact of delay on the value of
wife’s survivor benefit, then one response might be to require spousal consent to early 
claiming.61  If households are simply following social norms, then setting appropriate 
 
 born 
ts were 
its financial assets at age 62 are sufficient to fund consumption to time 62+k of an amount equal to the 
Social Security benefits payable at time 62+k, assuming a three percent real rate of return. 
60 Agnew et al (2008) provides evidence for framing effects. 
61 With a symmetrical requirement placed on wives, although the objective is primarily to affect the 
husband’s behavior. 
59 The Health and Retirement Study is a panel of over 7,000 households containing an individual
between 1931 and 1941 who were interviewed every two years from 1992.  Younger birth cohor
added in 1998 and 2004.  We define financial assets as including non-pension financial assets, plus IRAs.  
A household is classified as having sufficient financial assets to delay claiming from age 62 to age 62+k if 
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defaults might influence behavior.62  But a reluctance to decumulate financial assets ma
also be
y 
 prompted by a demand for liquidity in the presence of uncertain health care costs.  
63
This line of research is at an early stage.  DeNardi et al have argued that uncertainty over 
medical expenses may explain why wealthy retired households decumulate their wealth 
relatively slowly.  But it is less clear what effect it does or should have on the value of 
annuitization.   
 
                                                            
62 Mitchell and Utkus (2004) have shown that defaults have a strong impact on participation in and the level 
hawsky (2008). Turra and Mitchell (2004), and Yogo (2008). 
of contributions to 401(k) plans. 
63 See Pang and Wars
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Tables and Figures 
 
Age Difference 0-30 30-40 40-100
0 66,66 67,66 69,62
1 67,66 67,66 69,62
2 68,66 68,65 69,62
3 68,65 69,62 69,62
4 68,64 69,62 69,62
5 68,62 69,62 69,62
6 68,62 69,62 69,62
Percent of households 32 11 47
Wife's PIA of as a Percent of Husband's PI
Table 1: Claim Ages at Which Expected Present Value of Social 
Security Benefits is Maximized (Husband, Wife)
A
Note: Age difference equals number of years the husband is older than the wife. 
 
 
Notes: Population mortality for 1946 birth cohort.  Rate of interest and time preference both equal three 
percent. 
 
Claim Age Money's Worth CRRA = 2 CRRA = 5 Money's Worth CRRA = 2 CRRA = 5
62 1.000 1.113 1.158 1.029 1.150 1.190
63 1.007 1.096 1.136 1.028 1.130 1.166
64 1.001 1.065 1.098 1.013 1.094 1.125
65 1.003 1.043 1.070 1.006 1.068 1.094
66 1.012 1.029 1.050 1.006 1.049 1.070
67 1.016 1.010 1.024 1.000 1.024 1.040
68 1.029 1.000 1.007 1.002 1.008 1.019
69 1.049 1.000 1.000 1.010 1.000 1.005
70 1.077 1.013 1.004 1.025 1.001 1.000
Single Men Single Women
Table 2: Social Security Equivalent Income - Single Men and Women
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 Female claim age 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 7
Male claim age
62 1.027 1.031 1.027 1.026 1.028 1.051 1.073 1.095 1.116
63 1.035 1.031 1.030 1.032 1.055 1.078 1.099 1.121
64 1.018 1.017 1.019 1.042 1.063 1.085 1.105
65 1.005 1.007 1.029 1.050 1.071 1.091
66 1.000 1.021 1.042 1.063 1.083
67 1.010 1.030 1.050 1.069
68 1.024 1.043 1.062
69 1.041 1.060
70 1.063
62 1.078 1.079 1.070 1.066 1.063 1.084 1.104 1.124 1.143
63 1.074 1.066 1.061 1.059 1.080 1.099 1.119 1.139
64 1.044 1.039 1.038 1.057 1.076 1.095 1.114
65 1.018 1.017 1.035 1.054 1.072 1.090
66 1.001 1.020 1.038 1.056 1.074
0
1.018 1.035 1.052
68 1.004 1.021 1.038
69 1.013 1.030
70 1.028
62 1.111 1.110 1.102 1.096 1.094 1.113 1.132 1.151 1.170
63 1.102 1.094 1.089 1.087 1.106 1.125 1.144 1.162
64 1.067 1.062 1.060 1.079 1.097 1.115 1.133
65 1.035 1.033 1.051 1.068 1.085 1.102
66 1.012 1.029 1.046 1.063 1.079
67 1.004 1.020 1.035 1.051
68 1.000 1.015 1.031
69 1.001 1.016
70 1.008
ble 3: Social security Equivalent Income - Single Earner Couple
CRRA = 2
CRRA = 5
Money's worths
67 1.000
Ta
Notes: See table three.  in addition assume 1) One earner couple 2) The husband and the wife are the same 
age. 
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 Female claim age 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
Male claim age
62 1.111 1.110 1.102 1.096 1.094 1.113 1.132 1.151 1.170
63 1.102 1.094 1.089 1.087 1.106 1.125 1.144 1.162
64 1.067 1.062 1.060 1.079 1.097 1.115 1.133
65 1.035 1.033 1.051 1.068 1.085 1.102
66 1.012 1.029 1.046 1.063 1.079
67 1.004 1.020 1.035 1.051
68 1.000 1.015 1.031
69 1.001 1.016
70 1.008
62 1.128 1.128 1.119 1.115 1.113 1.132 1.151 1.169 1.188
63 1.120 1.120 1.112 1.108 1.107 1.125 1.144 1.163 1.181
64 1.092 1.085 1.081 1.080 1.098 1.116 1.133 1.150
65 1.057 1.053 1.052 1.069 1.086 1.103 1.119
66 1.032 1.030 1.047 1.063 1.079 1.095
67 1.004 1.020 1.036 1.051 1.066
68 1.000 1.015 1.030 1.045
69 1.000 1.015 1.030
70 1.006 1.021
62 1.144 1.144 1.137 1.132 1.131 1.150 1.168 1.186 1.204
63 1.137 1.137 1.130 1.126 1.126 1.144 1.162 1.180 1.197
64 1.108 1.109 1.102 1.099 1.098 1.116 1.133 1.150 1.167
65 1.080 1.074 1.071 1.070 1.087 1.103 1.119 1.135
66 1.053 1.049 1.048 1.064 1.080 1.096 1.111
67 1.022 1.021 1.036 1.051 1.066 1.081
68 1.000 1.015 1.030 1.044 1.059
69 1.000 1.015 1.029 1.043
70 1.005 1.019 1.033
62 1.159 1.160 1.153 1.149 1.149 1.167 1.185 1.202 1.219
63 1.153 1.153 1.147 1.144 1.144 1.162 1.180 1.197 1.214
64 1.124 1.125 1.119 1.116 1.116 1.133 1.150 1.166 1.182
65 1.095 1.096 1.090 1.088 1.087 1.104 1.119 1.135 1.150
66 1.074 1.069 1.066 1.065 1.081 1.096 1.111 1.126
67 1.040 1.037 1.037 1.052 1.066 1.081 1.095
68 1.016 1.016 1.030 1.044 1.058 1.072
69 1.000 1.014 1.028 1.042 1.055
70 1.004 1.018 1.032 1.045
Table 4: Social security Equivalent Income - Age Difference 1-6 Years - CRRA = 5
Wife one year younger
Wife two years younger
Wife three years younger
Both the same age
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 Notes: See table four. Except husband has population mortality for the 1946 birth cohort.  Wife has 
population mortality for the 1947-1952 birth cohort, as appropriate.  The coefficient of risk aversion equals 
five. 
 
62 1.170 1.170 1.165 1.162 1.162 1.179 1.196 1.213 1.230
63 1.164 1.165 1.159 1.157 1.157 1.175 1.192 1.208 1.224
64 1.135 1.136 1.131 1.129 1.130 1.146 1.162 1.178 1.193
65 1.106 1.107 1.102 1.100 1.100 1.116 1.131 1.146 1.161
66 1.085 1.086 1.081 1.078 1.078 1.093 1.108 1.122 1.137
67 1.057 1.051 1.049 1.049 1.063 1.077 1.091 1.104
68 1.030 1.027 1.027 1.040 1.054 1.067 1.080
69 1.011 1.010 1.024 1.038 1.051 1.063
70 1.000 1.014 1.027 1.040 1.053
62 1.168 1.170 1.164 1.162 1.163 1.180 1.196 1.212 1.228
63 1.163 1.165 1.160 1.159 1.159 1.176 1.192 1.208 1.223
64 1.135 1.137 1.132 1.131 1.132 1.147 1.163 1.178 1.192
65 1.107 1.108 1.103 1.102 1.102 1.117 1.132 1.146 1.160
66 1.086 1.086 1.082 1.080 1.081 1.095 1.109 1.123 1.136
67 1.056 1.057 1.052 1.050 1.051 1.064 1.077 1.090 1.103
68 1.034 1.030 1.028 1.028 1.041 1.054 1.066 1.078
69 1.013 1.011 1.011 1.024 1.036 1.049 1.060
70 1.000 1.000 1.013 1.025 1.037 1.049
62 1.167 1.168 1.164 1.163 1.163 1.179 1.195 1.210 1.225
63 1.163 1.164 1.161 1.159 1.161 1.176 1.192 1.207 1.221
64 1.135 1.136 1.133 1.132 1.133 1.148 1.163 1.177 1.191
65 1.107 1.108 1.104 1.103 1.104 1.118 1.132 1.145 1.158
66 1.086 1.087 1.083 1.082 1.083 1.096 1.110 1.122 1.134
67 1.056 1.057 1.053 1.051 1.052 1.065 1.077 1.089 1.101
68 1.033 1.034 1.030 1.028 1.029 1.041 1.053 1.065 1.076
69 1.017 1.013 1.011 1.012 1.024 1.035 1.047 1.058
70 1.002 1.000 1.000 1.012 1.024 1.035 1.046
Wife four years younger
Wife five years younger
Wife six years younger
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 Female claim age 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
Male claim age
62 1.111 1.110 1.102 1.096 1.094 1.113 1.132 1.151 1.170
63 1.102 1.094 1.089 1.087 1.106 1.125 1.144 1.162
64 1.067 1.062 1.060 1.079 1.097 1.115 1.133
65 1.035 1.033 1.051 1.068 1.085 1.102
66 1.012 1.029 1.046 1.063 1.079
67 1.004 1.020 1.035 1.051
68 1.000 1.015 1.031
69 1.001 1.016
70 1.008
62 1.137 1.136 1.127 1.122 1.119 1.139 1.159 1.178 1.197
63 1.136 1.128 1.119 1.114 1.112 1.132 1.152 1.171 1.190
64 1.115 1.108 1.092 1.087 1.086 1.104 1.123 1.141 1.160
65 1.094 1.087 1.073 1.060 1.058 1.076 1.094 1.111 1.129
66 1.078 1.072 1.058 1.047 1.037 1.054 1.071 1.088 1.105
67 1.057 1.052 1.039 1.028 1.019 1.028 1.044 1.060 1.076
68 1.043 1.038 1.026 1.016 1.008 1.015 1.024 1.040 1.056
69 1.034 1.029 1.018 1.009 1.001 1.008 1.017 1.026 1.041
70 1.031 1.026 1.016 1.007 1.000 1.007 1.014 1.023 1.033
62 1.154 1.154 1.152 1.152 1.154 1.156 1.160 1.166 1.175
63 1.146 1.147 1.145 1.145 1.148 1.149 1.154 1.160 1.169
64 1.118 1.119 1.117 1.117 1.120 1.122 1.126 1.132 1.141
65 1.090 1.091 1.089 1.089 1.092 1.093 1.097 1.103 1.111
66 1.069 1.070 1.067 1.067 1.070 1.071 1.075 1.080 1.088
67 1.043 1.044 1.042 1.042 1.043 1.045 1.048 1.053 1.061
68 1.024 1.025 1.022 1.022 1.024 1.025 1.028 1.033 1.040
69 1.010 1.011 1.009 1.009 1.010 1.011 1.014 1.019
70 1.002 1.003 1.000 1.000 1.002 1.003 1.006 1.010 1.017
1.026
Table 5: Social security Equivalent Income - Two Earner Couples - CRRA = 5
The wife's PIA is 0% of the husband's PIA
The wife's PIA is 50% of the husband's PIA
The wife's PIA is 25% of the husband's PIA
Notes: See table four. Except the wife has her own PIA as a percentage of her husband's PIA.  The 
oefficient of risk aversion equals five. 
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 Female claim age 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
Male claim age
62 1.111 1.110 1.102 1.096 1.094 1.113 1.132 1.151 1.170
63 1.102 1.094 1.089 1.087 1.106 1.125 1.144 1.162
64 1.067 1.062 1.060 1.079 1.097 1.115 1.133
65 1.035 1.033 1.051 1.068 1.085 1.102
66 1.012 1.029 1.046 1.063 1.079
67 1.004 1.020 1.035 1.051
68 1.000 1.015 1.031
69 1.001 1.016
70 1.008
62 1.105 1.104 1.095 1.090 1.088 1.107 1.127 1.146 1.165
63 1.096 1.088 1.083 1.081 1.101 1.120 1.139 1.157
64 1.062 1.057 1.055 1.074 1.092 1.111 1.128
65 1.031 1.029 1.047 1.065 1.082 1.099
66 1.009 1.026 1.044 1.060 1.077
67 1.002 1.018 1.034 1.051
68 1.000 1.016 1.032
69 1.004 1.019
70 1.014
62 1.089 1.088 1.080 1.074 1.073 1.092 1.112 1.132 1.151
63 1.081 1.073 1.068 1.067 1.087 1.107 1.126 1.145
64 1.049 1.045 1.043 1.062 1.081 1.100 1.119
65 1.021 1.020 1.038 1.057 1.075 1.093
66 1.003 1.021 1.039 1.057 1.075
67 1.000 1.018 1.036 1.053
68 1.004 1.022 1.040
69 1.016 1.034
70 1.039
Table 6: Social security Equivalent Income - Impatient and High/Low Mortality Couples - CRRA = 5
Five percent rate of time preference
Ten percent rate of time preference
Three percent arte of time preference, population avearge mortality
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 Notes: See table four. Except time preference and mortality changed as appropriate. Coefficient of risk 
aversion equals five. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 1.098 1.100 1.095 1.092 1.093 1.112 1.131 1.149 1.166
63 1.094 1.089 1.087 1.088 1.107 1.126 1.144 1.161
64 1.062 1.061 1.062 1.080 1.098 1.115 1.131
65 1.033 1.034 1.051 1.068 1.084 1.100
66 1.012 1.029 1.045 1.061 1.077
67 1.003 1.019 1.034 1.049
68 1.000 1.015 1.029
69 1.002 1.016
70 1.009
62 1.115 1.114 1.104 1.097 1.094 1.113 1.132 1.152 1.171
63 1.105 1.095 1.089 1.086 1.105 1.124 1.143 1.162
64 1.068 1.062 1.059 1.078 1.096 1.114 1.132
65 1.036 1.033 1.051 1.068 1.085 1.103
66 1.012 1.029 1.046 1.063 1.080
67 1.003 1.020 1.036 1.052
68 1.000 1.016 1.031
69 1.001 1.017
70 1.008
Black less than high school
White College Educated
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Figure 1: Optimal Consumption Path - Single Males
62
66
Optimal
70
 
Notes: Population mortality for 1946 birth cohort.  Rate of interest and time preference both equal three 
percent. Coefficient of risk aversion equals five. 
Notes: See figure one, in addition assume 1) One earner couple 2) The husband and the wife are the same 
age. 
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Figure 2: Optimal Consumption Path - Married Couples - Base
Both 62
Both 66
Optimal
Both 70
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Notes: See figure two, except using black less than high school group mortality 
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Figure 3: Optimal Consumption Path - Married Couples - High Mortality
Both 62
Both 66
Optimal
Both 70
Age
